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The	Minnesota	Supreme	Court’s	recent	decision	in	Fenrich	v.	The	
Blake	School	is	a	short	course	on	Minnesota	tort	law.1	Arising	out	of	
an	accident	involving	a	student-driven	car	on	the	way	to	a	post-season	
athletic	 event,	 the	 case	 required	 the	 court	 to	 consider	whether	 the	
school	 owed	 a	 duty	 to	 the	 two	 passengers	 in	 the	 other	 car,	 one	 of	
whom	died	in	the	accident.2	There	were	three	interrelated	duty	issues	
in	 the	 case.3	 First	 the	 court	 assessed	whether	 the	 school	 was	 in	 a	
	
        †					Mike	Steenson,	Bell	Distinguished	Professor	of	Law,	Mitchell	Hamline	
School	of	Law.	The	author	wishes	to	thank	Michelle	Gibbons	for	her	excellent	re-
search	assistance	in	preparation	of	this	article.	
	 1.	 920	N.W.2d	195	(Minn.	2018).	
	 2.	 Id.	at	200–01.	
	 3.	 Id.	at	201–06.	
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special	relationship	with	the	student,	sufficient	to	trigger	a	duty	to	the	
Fenrichs.4	The	court	held	that	there	was	no	special	relationship	be-
tween	the	school	and	student	that	would	extend	to	a	third	party	in-
jured	 by	 the	 student’s	 negligence.5	 Second,	 the	 court	 determined	
whether	the	school’s	role	as	the	facilitator	in	sending	students	to	the	
meet	constituted	misfeasance	or	nonfeasance.6	The	court	held	that	the	
issue	had	to	be	resolved	at	trial.7	Finally,	the	court	assessed	whether	
the	accident	was	foreseeable.8	The	court	held	that	the	foreseeability	
issue	presented	a	 close	case	 that	had	 to	be	 resolved	by	 the	 trier	of	
fact.9	The	court’s	remand	raises	important	questions	concerning	the	
relationship	of	judge	and	jury	in	the	resolution	of	the	key	issues	in	the	
case.10	
The	 special	 relationship	 issue,	misfeasance/nonfeasance	 issue,	
and	foreseeability	issues	recur	in	Minnesota	tort	law.	The	purpose	of	
this	article	is	to	put	the	issues	in	a	broader	context	and	evaluate	the	
supreme	court’s	treatment	of	them	in	Fenrich.	Following	a	short	state-
ment	of	facts,	this	article	considers	the	duty	issues	in	order.	
I.	THE	FACTS	
The	case	arose	out	of	an	accident	 that	 resulted	 in	 the	death	of	
Gary	Fenrich	and	serious	injuries	to	his	wife,	JeanAnn	Fenrich.	T.M.,	a	
sixteen-year-old	 student	 from	 the	 Blake	 School,	 who	 were	 driving	
with	a	volunteer	coach	and	two	teammates	to	an	out-of-season	Nike	
cross-country	meet.	The	Minnesota	State	High	School	League	season	
had	 ended,	 and	 coaches	 were	 not	 permitted	 to	 participate	 in	 the	
meet.11	However,	the	head	and	assistant	coaches	assisted	the	students	
in	preparing	for	the	meet.12	After	exchanging	emails	with	the	coaches,	
	
	 4.	 Id.	at	202–03.	
	 5.	 Id.	
	 6.	 Id.	at	203.	
	 7.	 Id.	at	215	n.4	(holding	that	the	distinction	between	“misfeasance	[and]	non-
feasance	is	a	question	of	law”	and	“when	there	are	genuine	issues	about	what	the	de-
fendant	did	or	the	responsibilities	it	assumed,	a	court	may	not	be	able	to	decide	the	
question	by	summary	judgment	on	a	paper	record”).	
	 8.	 Id.	
	 9.	 Id.	at	206–07.	
	 10.	 Id.	at	205.	
	 11.	 Id.	
	 12.	 Id.		
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T.M.’s	 parents	 agreed	 to	 let	 their	 son	 drive.13	 The	 student’s	 car	
crossed	the	centerline	and	hit	the	Fenrichs’	car.14		
Fenrich,	 individually	 and	 as	 her	 husband’s	 trustee,	 sued	 the	
school,	head	coach,	assistant	coach,	and	volunteer	coach.15	Following	
the	district	court’s	grant	of	summary	judgment	for	the	defendants,	the	
Minnesota	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 affirmed—although	 on	 different	
grounds—and	 the	Minnesota	Supreme	Court	granted	review.16	The	
supreme	court	agreed	with	the	district	court	and	court	of	appeals	con-
cluding,	“that	the	school	went	beyond	passive	inaction	by	assuming	
supervision	and	control	over	its	athletic	team’s	trip	to	Sioux	Falls.”17	
The	district	court	concluded	the	school	did	not	owe	a	duty	to	the	
general	public	 to	control	 the	conduct	of	 its	students.18	The	court	of	
appeals	affirmed	on	the	basis	that	there	was	insufficient	evidence	to	
establish	that	injury	to	third	parties	was	foreseeable.19	The	supreme	
court	reversed,	holding	that	foreseeability	was	a	close	case	and	one	
for	the	trier	of	fact	to	resolve.20	To	get	to	that	issue,	the	court	first	con-
sidered	whether	there	was	a	special	relationship	that	would	impose	
on	 the	 school	 an	 affirmative	duty	 to	 act.21	The	 court	 next	 assessed	
whether	the	school	affirmatively	created	a	risk	of	injury.22	And	finally,	
the	court	determined	whether	the	school’s	conduct	created	a	foresee-
able	risk	of	injury.23	
II.	DUTY	AND	SPECIAL	RELATIONSHIPS	
The	court	first	focused	on	whether	there	was	a	duty	based	on	a	
special	relationship	between	the	school	and	plaintiff.24	
The	court	began	 its	analysis	by	noting	 that	 there	 is	no	general	
duty	to	control	the	conduct	of	a	third	person	unless	there	is	a	special	
relationship	between	the	defendant	and	the	plaintiff,	and	the	harm	the	
	
	 13.	 Id.	at	199.		
	 14.	 Id.	at	198.	
	 15.	 Id.	at	200.	
	 16.	 Id.	at	200–01.	
	 17.	 Id.	at	203.		
	 18.	 Id.	at	200.		
	 19.	 Id.	at	201.		
	 20.	 Id.	at	205–07.		
	 21.	 Id.	at	202–03.		
	 22.	 Id.	at	203–05.	
	 23.	 Id.	at	205–07.		
	 24.	 Id.	at	202–03.	While	the	court	began	its	analysis	with	the	special	relationship	
issue,	that	problem	would	have	been	avoided	had	the	court	first	considered	whether	
the	school	affirmatively	created	a	risk	of	injury	to	third	persons.	See	id.	
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plaintiff	suffers	is	foreseeable,25	or	where	“the	defendant’s	own	con-
duct	creates	a	foreseeable	risk	of	injury	to	a	foreseeable	plaintiff.”	26	
The	issue	of	misfeasance/nonfeasance	is	key	to	determining	if	a	
duty	 is	 owed.	 If	 there	 is	 nonfeasance,	 there	 is	 no	 duty	 to	 the	 third	
party,	absent	a	rule	triggering	a	duty	to	act.	A	special	relationship	be-
tween	the	defendant	and	plaintiff27	or	the	defendant	and	the	person	
who	causes	the	injury28	acts	as	a	trigger.		
A.	Special	Relationships	
A	finding	that	a	special	relationship	exists	is	not	conclusive	on	the	
duty	 issue,	however.	Rather,	 the	duty	requirement	 is	a	special	rela-
tionship	plus.	Justice	Simonett	explained	this	in	Erickson	v.	Curtis	In-
vestment	Co.29	The	court	 in	Erickson	 stated,	 “Whether	a	duty	 is	 im-
posed	depends,	therefore,	on	the	relationship	of	the	parties	and	the	
foreseeable	risk	involved.	Ultimately,	the	question	is	one	of	policy.”30	
The	special	relationship	inquiry	is	compound	not	singular.	
The	court’s	 list	of	special	relationships	 includes	 those	between	
parents	and	their	children,	masters	and	servants,	possessors	of	land	
	
	 25.	 Id.	(quoting	Doe	169	v.	Brandon,	845	N.W.2d	174,	178	(Minn.	2014));	see	also	
Lundgren	v.	Fultz,	354	N.W.2d	25,	27	(Minn.	1984);	Delgado	v.	Lohmar,	289	N.W.2d	
479,	483	(Minn.	1979).	A	duty	may	also	arise	where	the	defendant	and	person	causing	
the	 injury	 are	 in	 a	 special	 relationship.	RESTATEMENT	 (THIRD)	OF	TORTS:	LIABILITY	 FOR	
PHYSICAL	AND	EMOTIONAL	HARM	§	41	(AM.	LAW	INST.	2010).	
	 26.	 Domagala	v.	Rolland,	805	N.W.2d	14,	23	(Minn.	2011).	The	“foreseeable	risk	
of	injury	to	a	foreseeable	plaintiff”	appears	for	the	first	time	in	the	Domagala	case.	See	
id.	
	 27.	 See	Delgado,	289	N.W.2d	at	483.	
	 28.	 See	Lundgren,	354	N.W.2d	at	27.	
	 29.	 447	N.W.2d	165,	168–69	(Minn.	1989).	
	 30.	 Id.	In	Erickson,	the	court	considered	the	issue	of	whether	the	owner	and	op-
erator	of	a	parking	ramp	was	liable	to	a	ramp	customer	who	was	criminally	assaulted	
in	the	ramp.	Id.	at	168;	see	also	Funchess	v.	Cecil	Newman	Corp.,	632	N.W.2d	666,	673	
(Minn.	2001)	(discussing	that	a	special	relationship	between	landlord	and	tenant	is	
not	recognized).	In	Funchess,	the	court	reiterated	the	policy	considerations	noted	in	
Erickson:		
[C]rime	 prevention	 is	 essentially	 a	 government	 function,	 not	 a	 private	
duty;	 criminals	 are	 unpredictable	 and	 bent	 on	 defeating	 security	
measures;	and	because	the	issue	arises	where	existing	security	precau-
tions	have	 failed,	 the	question	will	 always	be	whether	 further	 security	
measures	were	required	and	a	property	owner	will	have	little	idea	what	
is	expected	of	him	or	her.		
Id.	at	673	n.4	(citing	Erickson,	447	N.W.2d	at	169).	
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who	hold	their	property	open	to	the	public,	and	common	carriers	and	
their	customers.31				
In	Bjerke	v.	Johnson,	the	supreme	court	saw	special	relationships	
as	existing	“under	any	one	of	three	distinct	scenarios.”32	The	first	sce-
nario	 is	based	on	the	status	of	 the	parties.33	The	second	 is	where	a	
person,	“whether	voluntarily	or	as	required	by	law,”	takes	custody	of	
another	under	circumstances	where	the	other	person	“is	deprived	of	
normal	 opportunities	 of	 self-protection.”34	 And	 the	 third	 involves	
cases	where	a	person	assumes	responsibility	for	a	duty	that	is	owed	
by	one	person	to	a	third	party.	In	those	cases,	a	duty	arises	when	the	
person	does	the	following:	
“[U]ndertakes,	gratuitously	or	 for	consideration,	 to	render	
services	to	another	which	he	should	recognize	as	necessary	
for	the	protection	of	a	third	person	or	his	things,”	and	liabil-
ity	will	be	imposed	if	(1)	his	failure	to	act	increases	the	risk	
of	harm;	(2)	he	undertook	a	duty	owed	by	the	other	to	the	
third	party;	or	(3)	the	harm	is	suffered	because	the	other	or	
the	third	person	relied	on	the	undertaking.35		
While	Bjerke	is	a	standard	statement	of	the	recognized	special	re-
lationships	in	Minnesota,	the	list	is	not	exclusive.	The	supreme	court’s	
final	“special	relationship,”	the	undertaking	of	a	duty,	is	really	a	sepa-
rate	duty	trigger	that	is	distinct	from	the	other	special	relationships	
recognized	by	the	court.	The	duty	does	not	depend	on	the	relationship	
of	the	parties,	as	do	the	other	special	relationships;	but,	rather,	on	an	
agreement	to	assume	a	duty	that	works	to	the	benefit	of	the	plaintiff.	
The	Restatement	(Third)	of	Torts:	Liability	for	Physical	and	Emo-
tional	Harm	provides	a	useful	parallel	list	for	organizing	special	rela-
tionships.	The	Restatement	breaks	special	relationships	into	two	cat-
egories,	with	some	overlap.	Section	40	lists	the	special	relationships	
	
	 31.	 See	H.B.	v.	Whittemore,	552	N.W.2d	705,	708	(Minn.	1996)	(citation	omit-
ted);	Donaldson	v.	Young	Women’s	Christian	Ass’n	of	Duluth,	539	N.W.2d	789,	792	
(Minn.	1995);	Harper	v.	Herman,	499	N.W.2d	472,	474	(Minn.	1993).	
	 32.	 742	N.W.2d	660,	665	(Minn.	2007).	Bjerke	involved	a	custodial	relationship	
assumed	by	the	defendant	of	the	teenage	plaintiff,	who	was	subject	to	sexual	advances	
by	the	defendant’s	live-in	male	friend.	See	id.	
	 33.	 Id.	 (quoting	 Delgado	 v.	 Lohmar,	 289	 N.W.2d	 479,	 483–84	 (Minn.	 1979);	
RESTATEMENT	(SECOND)	OF	TORTS	§§	314,	315	(AM.	LAW	INST.	1965))	(“The	 first	arises	
from	the	status	of	the	parties,	such	as	‘parents	and	children,	masters	and	servants,	
possessors	of	land	and	licensees,	[and]	common	carriers	and	their	customers.’”).	
	 34.	 Id.	at	665	(quoting	Harper,	499	N.W.2d	at	474).	
	 35.	 Id.	(quoting	Walsh	v.	Pagra	Air	Taxi,	Inc.,	282	N.W.2d	567,	571	(Minn.	1979);	
RESTATEMENT	(SECOND)	OF	TORTS	§	324A	(AM.	LAW	INST.	1965)).	
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between	the	defendant	and	the	victim	that	will	create	a	duty.36	Section	
41	lists	the	relationships	between	the	defendant	and	the	person	who	
causes	the	injury	that	will	impose	a	duty	on	the	defendant.37	
Section	40’s	list	of	non-exclusive38	special	relationships	includes:	
(1) a	common	carrier	with	its	passengers,	
(2) an	innkeeper	with	its	guests,	
(3) 	a	business	or	other	possessor	of	land	that	holds	its	prem-
ises	open	to	the	public	with	those	who	are	lawfully	on	the	
premises,	
(4) an	employer	with	its	employees	who,	while	at	work	are:	
(a)	in	imminent	danger;	or	
(b)		injured	or	ill	and	thereby	rendered	helpless,	
(5) a	school	with	its	students,		
(6) a	landlord	with	its	tenants,	and	
(7) a	custodian	with	those	in	its	custody,	if:		
(a)		the	custodian	is	required	by	law	to	take	custody	or	vol-
untarily	takes	custody	of	the	other;	and		
(b)	the	 custodian	 has	 a	 superior	 ability	 to	 protect	 the	
other.39	
The	Restatement	takes	the	position	that	the	defendant	who	is	in	
a	special	relationship	with	the	plaintiff	owes	a	duty	of	reasonable	care	
as	to	risks	arising	within	the	scope	of	that	relationship.40	
The	 Third	 Restatement	 expands	 on	 the	 special	 relationships	
listed	in	the	more	familiar	section	314A	of	the	Second	Restatement	of	
Torts,41	 which	 recognized	 the	 first,	 second,	 third,	 and	 seventh	
	
	 36.	 Restatement	(Third)	of	Torts:	Liability	for	Physical	and	Emotional	Harm	§	
40	(Am.	Law	Inst.	2010).	
	 37.	 Id.	§	41.	
	 38.	 Id.	§	40	cmt.	o.	
	 39.	 Id.	§	40(b).	The	list	is	not	intended	to	be	exclusive.	The	comments	note,	for	
example,	that	family	relationships	are	likely	to	be	categorized	as	a	special	relation-
ship.	Id.	§	40	cmt.	o.	
	 40.	 Id.	§	40(a).	
	 41.	 Restatement	(Second)	of	Torts	§	314A	(Am.	Law	Inst.	1965).	Section	314A	
states:	
(1) A	common	carrier	is	under	a	duty	to	its	passengers	to	take	reasonable	
action	
(a)		to	protect	them	against	unreasonable	risk	of	physical	harm,	and	
	 (b)		to	give	them	first	aid	after	it	knows	or	has	reason	to	know	that	they	
are	ill	or	injured,	and	to	care	for	them	until	they	can	be	cared	for	by	
others.	
6
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relationships	on	the	list,	and	in	section	314B	of	the	Second	Restate-
ment	of	Torts	42	which	recognized	 the	special	 relationship	between	
employer	and	employee.	Section	40	also	replaces	section	344,	which	
overlapped	with	section	314A	and	imposed	a	duty	of	reasonable	care	
on	a	possessor	of	land	who	held	it	open	to	the	public	to	avoid	injuries	
to	entrants	caused	by	the	conduct	of	third	persons.43		
The	special	relationships	impose	a	duty	on	the	defendant	to	use	
reasonable	care	with	respect	to	the	risks	that	arise	within	the	scope	
of	that	relationship.	That	duty	includes	the	duty	to	guard	against	the	
conduct	of	third	persons.44	
Section	41	covers	cases	where	the	actor	is	in	a	special	relation-
ship	with	 the	 person	who	 causes	 harm	 to	 the	 injured	 person.	 The	
“[s]pecial	relationships	giving	rise	to	the	duty	.	.	.	include:	(1)	a	parent	
with	dependent	children,	(2)	a	custodian	with	those	in	its	custody,	(3)	
an	 employer	 with	 employees	 when	 the	 employment	 facilitates	 the	
employee’s	causing	harm	to	third	parties,	and	(4)	a	mental-health	pro-
fessional	with	patients.”45	
The	special	 relationships	noted	 in	 the	Third	Restatement	align	
with	the	special	relationships	recognized	by	the	Minnesota	Supreme	
Court.	The	court	has	recognized	all	of	the	special	relationships	noted	
in	sections	40	and	41	of	the	Third	Restatement,	with	the	exception	of	
	
(2) An	innkeeper	is	under	a	similar	duty	to	his	guests.	
(3) A	possessor	of	land	who	holds	it	open	to	the	public	is	under	a	similar	
duty	to	members	of	the	public	who	enter	in	response	to	his	invitation.	
(4) One	who	is	required	by	law	to	take	or	who	voluntarily	takes	the	custody	
of	another	under		circumstances	such	as	to	deprive	the	other	of	his	nor-
mal	opportunities	for	protection	is	under	a	similar	duty	to	the	other.	
Id.	
	 42.	 Id.	§	314B.	
	 43.	 RESTATEMENT	(THIRD)	OF	TORTS:	LIABILITY	FOR	PHYSICAL	AND	EMOTIONAL	HARM	§	40	
CMT.	A	(AM.	LAW	INST.	2010).	
	 44.	 Id.	§	40	cmt.	g.	
	 45.	 Id.	§	41.	As	with	section	40,	the	comments	note	the	list	is	not	intended	to	be	
exclusive.	Id.	§	41	cmt.	i.	Section	41	replaces	several	sections	of	the	Restatement	(Sec-
ond)	of	Torts,	including	section	315(a)	(no	duty	to	control	conduct	of	a	third	person	
absent	a	special	relationship);	section	316	(duty	of	parent	to	control	conduct	of	child);	
section	317	(duty	of	master	to	control	conduct	of	servant);	and	section	319	(duty	of	
those	in	charge	of	persons	having	dangerous	propensities).	Id.	§	41	cmt.	a.	However,	
it	adds	a	new	provision	covering	mental	health	professionals	and	their	patients	 to	
reflect	recent	developments	in	case	law.	See	id.	
7
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the	 landlord-tenant	 relationship	 in	 section	 40(b)(6).46	 Fenrich	 in-
volved	the	student-school	relationship.47	
	
	 46.	 This	footnote	explains	in	slightly	more	detail	the	supreme	court’s	standard	
list	of	recognized	special	relationships.	The	court	has	recognized	that	defendants	owe	
duties	to	injured	persons	in	different	settings,	although	the	court	did	not	specifically	
label	those	relationships	as	“special”	relationships.	The	label	is	unimportant;	the	im-
position	of	a	duty	is.	For	organizational	purposes,	this	footnote	follows	the	Third	Re-
statement’s	special	relationship	list.		
(1) a	common	carrier	with	its	passengers	
	 	 The	 supreme	 court	 has	 been	 consistent	 in	 holding	 that	 common	 carriers	
have	a	duty	to	exercise	the	utmost	or	highest	degree	of	care	for	their	passengers.	See,	
e.g.,	George	v.	Estate	of	Baker,	724	N.W.2d	1,	9–10	(Minn.	2006);	Lindstrom	v.	Yellow	
Taxi	Co.	of	Minneapolis,	298	Minn.	224,	226,	214	N.W.2d	672,	674–75	(1974);	Ford	v.	
Stevens,	280	Minn.	16,	19,	157	N.W.2d	510,	513	(1968);	Fieve	v.	Emmeck,	248	Minn.	
122,	126–28,	78	N.W.2d	343,	346–48	(1956);	McKellar	v.	Yellow	Cab	Co.,	148	Minn.	
247,	250,	181	N.W.	348,	349	(1921).	
(2) an	innkeeper	with	its	guests	
	 	 In	Alholm	v.	Wilt,	394	N.W.2d	488,	490	(Minn.	1986),	the	court	recognized	
that	“[t]avern	owners	in	Minnesota	have	the	duty	to	exercise	reasonable	care	under	
the	circumstances	to	protect	their	patrons	from	injury.”	The	supreme	court	approved	
the	trial	court’s	jury	instructions	that	required	a	showing	that	the	proprietor	was	on	
notice	 of	 the	 offending	 party’s	 vicious	 or	 dangerous	 propensities	 by	 some	 act	 or	
threat,	that	the	proprietor	had	an	adequate	opportunity	to	act	for	the	protection	of	
the	patron	who	was	injured,	failed	to	act	reasonably	to	protect	the	patron,	and	finally,	
that	the	injury	was	foreseeable.	Id.	at	489	n.3.	As	the	law	evolved,	a	jury	instruction	
that	was	approved	in	recognition	of	the	latitude	district	courts	have	in	framing	in-
structions	seemed	to	harden	into	elements.	See	Boone	v.	Martinez,	567	N.W.2d	508,	
510	(Minn.	1997)	(citing	Alholm,	394	N.W.2d	at	489	n.3).	
	 	 In	Henson	v.	Uptown	Drink,	LLC.,	922	N.W.2d	185	(Minn.	2019),	the	court	sug-
gested	a	 less	restrictive	standard	 for	resolving	 innkeeper	 liability	cases.	The	court	
noted	that	“when	the	totality	of	the	facts	and	circumstances	put	the	innkeeper	on	no-
tice,”	it	has	“held	that	there	[is]	a	duty	based	on	foreseeability,”	and,	at	least	in	that	
case,	the	foreseeability	was	a	question	for	the	trier	of	fact.	Id.	at	192.	The	court’s	ref-
erence	to	Klingbeil	v.	Truesdell,	256	Minn.	360,	363,	98	N.W.2d	134,	138	(1959),	in	
which	the	court	held	that	“there	is	ample	evidence	in	the	record	from	which	the	jury	
could	find	that	[the	patrons]	were	intoxicated	to	the	point	where	the	proprietor	or	his	
servant	should	have	been	aware	of	the	fact	that	their	conduct	would	lead	to	trouble,”	
and	Mettling	v.	Mulligan,	 303	Minn.	8,	11	n.3,	225	N.W.2d	825,	828	n.3	 (1975),	 in	
which	the	court	noted	that	it	has	“found	liability	in	tavern	owners	predicated	upon	
intoxication	of	the	offending	patron,”	frame	the	innkeeper’s	duty	more	broadly	than	
Boone’s	Alholm-based	formulation.	See	Henson,	922	N.W.2d	at	192.	
(3) a	business	or	other	possessor	of	land	that	holds	its	premises	open	
to	the	public	with	those	who	are	lawfully	on	the	premises	
	 	 The	Minnesota	courts	have	consistently	recognized	this	as	a	special	relation-
ship.	The	courts’	decisions	rely	on	section	314A(3)	of	the	Second	Restatement.	See,	
e.g.,	Bjerke	v.	 Johnson,	742	N.W.2d	660,	665	(Minn.	2007).	Section	40(b)(3)	of	 the	
Third	Restatement	replaces	section	314A(3).	RESTATEMENT	(THIRD)	OF	TORTS:	LIABILITY	
8
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FOR	PHYSICAL	AND	EMOTIONAL	HARM	§	40	cmt.	a	(AM.	LAW	INST.	2010).	It	is	important	to	
understand	the	reach	of	section	40(b)(3).	It	“imposes	an	affirmative	duty	on	a	subset	
of	land	possessors	for	certain	risks	that	do	not	arise	from	conditions	or	activities	on	
the	land.”	Id.	§	40	cmt.	j.	It	applies,	for	example,	in	cases	where	a	customer’s	incapac-
itation	is	not	related	to	a	condition	on	the	land.	Id.	§	40	illus.	4.		
The	Minnesota	Supreme	Court	has	recognized	the	distinction.	In	Louis	v.	Louis,	636	
N.W.2d	314	(Minn.	2001),	a	case	involving	a	swimming-pool-slide-accident,	the	su-
preme	court	drew	a	clear	distinction	between	premises-liability	cases	and	cases	in-
volving	possessors’	duties	arising	out	of	a	special	relationship.	The	defendant	sought	
to	tie	its	duty	to	warn	of	the	dangers	involved	in	using	the	pool	slide	to	a	special	rela-
tionship,	arguing	that	because	there	was	no	special	relationship,	there	was	no	duty	to	
the	plaintiff.	Id.	at	317,	320.	The	court,	however,	rejected	the	argument.	Id.	In	cases	
involving	premises	liability,	there	is	no	need	to	establish	a	special	relationship.	Id.	at	
320–21.	The	court	emphasized	that	it	has	“consistently	recognized	that	a	duty	based	
on	a	special	relationship	theory	is	separate	and	distinct	from	a	duty	based	on	a	prem-
ises	liability	theory.”	Id.	at	320.		
(4) an	employer	with	its	employees	
	 	 Section	 40(b)(4)	 replaces	 section	 314B	 of	 the	 Second	 Restatement.	
RESTATEMENT	(THIRD)	OF	TORTS:	LIABILITY	FOR	PHYSICAL	AND	EMOTIONAL	HARM	§	40	cmt.	k	
(AM.	LAW	INST.	2010).	Liability	in	these	cases	requires	a	showing	that	the	employee	is	
in	 “imminent	 danger”	 or	 is	 “injured	 or	 ill	 and	 thereby	 rendered	 helpless.”	 Id.	 §	
40(b)(4).	The	Minnesota	Court	of	Appeals	commented	on	section	314B	in	Schmitz	v.	
U.S.	Steel	Corp.	and	noted	that	a	special	relationship	between	employer	and	employee	
exists	only	in	cases	where	“an	employee,	‘acting	within	the	scope	of	his	employment,	
comes	 into	a	position	of	 imminent	danger	of	serious	harm.’”	831	N.W.2d	656,	679	
(Minn.	Ct.	App.	2013),	aff’d	in	part	and	rev’d	in	part,	852	N.W.2d	669	(Minn.	2014)	
(quoting	RESTATEMENT	(SECOND)	OF	TORTS	§	314B	(AM.	LAW	INST.	1965)).	However,	the	
theory	will	have	limited	reach	because	workers’	compensation	will	reach	most	cases	
involving	occupational	injuries.	The	Restatement	comments	note	these	limitations:	
The	circumstances	in	which	the	affirmative	duty	imposed	in	this	Subsec-
tion	might	apply	have	been	largely	limited	to	the	risk	to	an	employee	of	a	
criminal	attack	by	a	third	party	that	occurs	at	the	place	of	employment,	an	
illness	or	injury	suffered	by	an	employee	while	at	work	(but	not	resulting	
from	 employment)	 that	 renders	 the	 employee	 helpless	 and	 in	 need	 of	
emergency	care	or	assistance,	and	the	occasional	case	that	falls	through	
the	cracks	of	workers’-compensation	coverage	and	implicates	an	affirma-
tive	duty	as	opposed	to	the	ordinary	duty	imposed	by	§	7.	The	cases	that	
fall	through	the	cracks	are	quite	varied	because	of	the	variations	that	exist	
in	different	states’	workers’-compensation	statutes.	
RESTATEMENT	(THIRD)	OF	TORTS:	LIABILITY	FOR	PHYSICAL	AND	EMOTIONAL	HARM	§	40	cmt.	k	
(AM.	LAW	INST.	2010).	
(5) a	school	with	its	students	
	 	 See	infra	notes	63–76	and	accompanying	text.	
(6) a	landlord	with	its	tenants	
	 	 Kline	v.	1500	Mass.	Av.	Apartment	Corp.	 is	 the	key	case	concerning	a	 land-
lord’s	 duty	 to	 its	 tenants	 and	 tenants’	 guests.	See	439	F.2d	477,	 487–88	 (D.C.	 Cir.	
1970)	 (holding	 a	 landlord	 liable	 for	 the	 assault	 and	 robbery	 of	 tenant	 when	 the	
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landlord	knew	of	similar	incidents	of	crime	in	common	areas	in	the	past	due	to	faulty	
or	nonexistent	security,	rendering	such	crime	foreseeable).	It	started	a	national	trend	
toward	 recognition	 of	 the	 landlord-tenant	 relationship	 as	 a	 special	 relationship.	
RESTATEMENT	(THIRD)	OF	TORTS:	LIABILITY	FOR	PHYSICAL	AND	EMOTIONAL	HARM	§	40	cmt.	m	
(AM.	LAW	INST.	2010).	Notwithstanding	Kline,	Minnesota	law	has	never	recognized	a	
special	relationship	between	a	landlord	and	tenant	that	gives	rise	to	a	landlord’s	duty	
to	protect	a	tenant	from	third	parties.	In	Funchess	v.	Cecil	Newman	Corp.,	632	N.W.2d	
666,	668	(Minn.	2001),	a	landlord	was	accused	of	breaching	such	a	duty	when	intrud-
ers	gained	access	to	a	tenant’s	apartment	through	an	unsecured	exterior	door	and	
murdered	the	tenant.	The	court	acknowledged	the	possibility	that	the	landlord	could	
be	held	liable	for	undertaking	a	duty	under	section	323	of	the	Second	Restatement	of	
Torts	by	installing	a	security	system	in	the	building	but	the	court	held	that	the	facts	
did	not	support	this	theory.	Funchess,	632	N.W.2d	at	674–75.	
(7)	a	custodian	with	those	in	its	custody,	if:	a)	the	custodian	is	required	by	law	to	take	
custody	or	voluntarily	takes	custody	of	the	other;	and	b)	the	custodian	has	a	superior	
ability	to	protect	the	other.	
	 	 Section	40(b)(7)	replaces	section	314A(4)	of	the	Second	Restatement,	which	
has	been	frequently	cited	by	the	supreme	court	as	one	of	 the	special	relationships	
recognized	in	Minnesota	law.	See,	e.g.,	H.B.	v.	Whittemore,	552	N.W.2d	705,	708	(Minn.	
1996);	Donaldson	v.	Young	Women’s	Christian	Ass’n	of	Duluth,	539	N.W.2d	789,	792	
(Minn.	1995);	Harper	v.	Herman,	499	N.W.2d	472,	474	(Minn.	1993).	The	court,	 in	
Bjerke	 v.	 Johnson,	 742	N.W.2d	660,	 665–67	 (Minn.	 2007),	 applied	 section	314A	 in	
holding	that	a	custodial	relationship	was	established	between	plaintiff,	a	minor	at	the	
time,	and	the	horse	farm	owner	she	stayed	with	when	she	was	sexually	abused	by	
another	adult	resident	at	the	farm.	
	 	 A	duty	may	also	be	based	on	the	defendant’s	relationship	with	the	person	
causing	harm.	Section	41	of	the	Third	Restatement	covers	cases	where	the	actor	is	in	
a	special	relationship	with	the	person	who	causes	harm	to	the	injured	person.	The	
“[s]pecial	relationships	giving	rise	to	the	duty	.	.	.	include:	(1)	a	parent	with	dependent	
children,	(2)	a	custodian	with	those	in	its	custody,	(3)	an	employer	with	employees	
when	the	employment	facilitates	the	employee’s	causing	harm	to	third	parties,	and	
(4)	 a	 mental-health	 professional	 with	 patients.”	 RESTATEMENT	 (THIRD)	 OF	 TORTS:	
LIABILITY	FOR	PHYSICAL	AND	EMOTIONAL	HARM	§	41	(AM.	LAW	INST.	2010).	
(1) parent	with	dependent	children	
	 	 Section	316	of	the	Restatement	(Second)	of	Torts,	provides	that	parents	are	
under	a	duty	to	use	reasonable	care	to	control	their	minor	children	to	prevent	them	
from	causing	harm	to	others,	intentionally	or	negligently,	in	cases	where	(a)	the	par-
ents	know	or	have	reason	to	know	they	have	the	ability	to	control	their	children,	and	
(b)	know	or	should	know	of	the	need	and	opportunity	to	control	them.	RESTATEMENT	
(SECOND)	OF	TORTS	§	316	(AM.	LAW	INST.	1965).	Section	41	of	the	Restatement	(Third)	
of	Torts,	which	supersedes	section	316,	provides	that	“[a]n	actor	in	a	special	relation-
ship	with	another	owes	a	duty	of	reasonable	care	to	third	parties	with	regard	to	risks	
posed	by	the	other	that	arise	within	the	scope	of	the	relationship,”	and	identifies	one	
of	 those	 special	 relationships	 as	 “a	 parent	with	 dependent	 children.”	RESTATEMENT	
(THIRD)	OF	TORTS:	LIABILITY	FOR	PHYSICAL	AND	EMOTIONAL	HARM	§	41	(AM.	LAW	INST.	2010).	
	 	 The	Minnesota	Court	of	Appeals	has	recognized	the	special	relationship	be-
tween	parent	and	child	as	a	relationship	that	will	impose	a	duty	on	parents	to	prevent	
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certain	injuries	caused	by	their	children.	See,	e.g.,	Jaramillo	v.	Weaver,	No.	A06-2343,	
2007	WL	4303775,	at	*5	(Minn.	Ct.	App.	Dec.	11,	2007)	(holding	facts	insufficient	to	
establish	special	relationship	between	parents	and	adult	child);	Sarau	v.	Oliver,	No.	
C1-00-223,	2000	WL	1052143,	at	*2	(Minn.	Ct.	App.	Aug.	1,	2000)	(refusing	to	apply	
section	316	to	parent	of	twenty-year-old	son);	Kohn	v.	Ross,	No.	C0-97-198,	1997	WL	
423579,	at	*4	(Minn.	Ct.	App.	July	29,	1997)	(recognizing	parent-child	special	rela-
tionship	but	concluding	that	injury	to	plaintiff	at	party	hosted	by	fifteen-year-old	son	
was	unforeseeable);	Hansen	v.	C.H.,	No.	C2-91-1808,	1992	WL	67513,	at	*2	(Minn.	Ct.	
App.	Apr.	7,	1992)	(applying	section	316	but	holding	that	parents	did	not	have	suffi-
cient	 knowledge	 of	 their	 children’s	 dangerous	 propensities);	 Silberstein	 v.	 Cordie,	
474	N.W.2d	850,	855–56	(Minn.	Ct.	App.	1991)	(applying	section	316	to	parents	who	
failed	to	prevent	injury	caused	by	mentally	ill	twenty-seven-year-old	son).		
(2) A	custodian	with	those	in	its	custody	
	 	 This	is	a	long-standing	but	limited	special	relationship.	The	Third	Restate-
ment	notes	that	“[t]he	classic	custodian	under	this	Section	is	a	jailer	of	a	dangerous	
criminal,”	and	that	“[o]ther	well-established	custodial	relationships	include	hospitals	
for	the	mentally	ill	and	for	those	with	contagious	diseases.”	RESTATEMENT	(THIRD)	OF	
TORTS:	LIABILITY	FOR	PHYSICAL	AND	EMOTIONAL	HARM	§	41	cmt.	f	(AM.	LAW	INST.	2010).	Min-
nesota	courts	have	considered	this	theory,	including	under	section	319	of	the	Second	
Restatement	of	Torts,	which	was	replaced	by	section	41.	See	 Johnson	v.	State,	553	
N.W.2d	40,	49–50	(Minn.	1996)	(acknowledging	section	319,	but	finding	the	halfway	
house	owed	no	duty	to	plaintiffs	for	parolee	at	halfway	house	who	committed	rape	
and	murder	of	a	third	person);	Rum	River	Lumber	Co.	v.	State,	282	N.W.2d	882,	886	
(Minn.	1979)	(holding	there	was	a	duty	imposed	on	Anoka	State	Hospital	for	property	
damage	caused	by	escaped	patient);	Sylvester	v.	Nw.	Hosp.	of	Minneapolis,	236	Minn.	
384,	387–88,	53	N.W.2d	17,	19–20	(1952)	(holding	there	is	a	duty	imposed	on	the	
hospital	 to	 other	 patients	 when	 it	 accepts	 patients	 with	 mental	 disorders);	
Stuedeman	v.	Nose,	713	N.W.2d	79,	84	(Minn.	Ct.	App.	2009)	(holding	the	group	foster	
home	had	a	duty	with	respect	to	one	of	its	violent	residents).	
(3) Employer-employee	
	 	 The	Minnesota	 Supreme	Court	 has	 analyzed	negligent	 supervision	 claims	
both	under	Restatement	(Second)	of	Agency	§	213	(Am.	Law	Inst.	1958)	and	Restate-
ment	(Second)	of	Torts	§	317	(Am.	Law	Inst.	1965).	See	Semrad	v.	Edina	Realty,	Inc.,	
493	N.W.2d	528,	533–34	(Minn.	1992).		
	 	 The	court	adopted	 the	 tort	of	negligent	hiring	 in	Ponticas	v.	K.M.S.	 Invest-
ments,	331	N.W.2d	907,	910–11	(Minn.	1983),	relying	on	Restatement	(Second)	of	
Agency	§	213.	Liability	is	based	on	the	employer’s	negligence	“in	placing	a	person	with	
known	propensities,	or	propensities	which	should	have	been	discovered	by	reasona-
ble	investigation,	in	an	employment	position	in	which,	because	of	the	circumstances	
of	the	employment,	it	should	have	been	foreseeable	that	the	hired	individual	posed	a	
threat	of	injury	to	others.”	Ponticas,	331	N.W.2d	at	911.	
	 	 Negligent	retention	was	first	recognized	in	Dean	v.	St.	Paul	Union	Depot	Co.,	
41	Minn.	360,	362–63,	43	N.W.	54,	54	(1889).	An	employer’s	liability	for	retaining	an	
employee	with	a	propensity	to	cause	harm	to	others	is	based	on	the	employer’s	“per-
sonal	fault	in	exposing	others	to	unreasonable	risk	of	injury	in	violation	of	the	[em-
ployer’s]	duty	to	exercise	due	care	for	their	protection.”	Porter	v.	Grennan	Bakeries,	
219	Minn.	14,	22,	16	N.W.2d	906,	910	(1944).	In	general,	“[a]n	employer	has	the	duty	
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B.	Special	Relationships	and	Fenrich	
In	Fenrich	v.	Blake	School,	the	school	urged	the	court	to	adopt	a	
categorical	rule	that	“a	school	never	owes	a	duty	of	care	to	non-stu-
dent	third	parties	for	injuries	resulting	from	student	conduct.”48	The	
court	declined.49	While	recognizing	the	importance	of	schools	in	a	civ-
ilized	society,	which	as	a	matter	of	policy	might	suggest	a	more	re-
strictive	liability	rule,	the	lack	of	precedent	for	the	no-duty	proposi-
tion	argued	by	the	school	prompted	the	court	to	conclude	that	there	
is	no	 justification	 for	exempting	schools	 from	basic	 tort	 law	princi-
ples.50		
	
‘to	 refrain	 from	 retaining	 employees	 with	 known	 dangerous	 proclivities.’”	 J.M.	 v.	
Minn.	Dist.	Council	of	Assemblies	of	God,	658	N.W.2d	589,	597	(Minn.	Ct.	App.	2003)	
(quoting	Yunker	v.	Honeywell,	Inc.,	496	N.W.2d	419,	423	(Minn.	Ct.	App.	1993),	rev.	
denied	(Minn.	Apr.	20,	1993));	see	also	Olson	v.	First	Church	of	Nazarene,	661	N.W.2d	
254,	264	(Minn.	Ct.	App.	2003)	(quoting	Yunker,	496	N.W.2d	at	423).	
	 	 	Minnesota,	however,	does	not	recognize	the	claim	of	negligent	training.	See,	
e.g.,	Soto	v.	Shealey,	331	F.	Supp.	3d	879,	884	n.1	(D.	Minn.	2018)	(citation	omitted);	
Peterson	v.	Bankers	Life	and	Cas.	Co.,	734	N.W.2d	275,	277	(Minn.	Ct.	App.	2007)	(ci-
tation	omitted);	M.L.	v.	Magnuson,	531	N.W.2d	849,	856	(Minn.	Ct.	App.1995)	(cita-
tion	omitted).	
(4) Mental	health	professionals	with	their	patients	
	 	 Tarasoff	v.	Regents	of	Univ.	of	Cal.,	551	P.2d	334	(Cal.	1976),	is	the	seminal	
case	in	which	the	California	Supreme	Court	imposed	a	duty	on	a	psychotherapist	to	
warn	a	third	person	of	death	threats	made	toward	the	third	person	by	the	psycho-
therapist’s	patient.	Id.	at	340.	Minnesota	courts	have	considered	the	role	of	a	mental	
health	professional	to	act	for	the	protection	of	third	persons	in	a	handful	of	cases.	For	
example,	 in	Lundgren	 v.	 Fultz,	 the	 court	 recognized	 that	 a	 special	 relationship	be-
tween	a	psychiatrist	and	patient	could	be	the	basis	for	a	limited	duty	giving	rise	to	the	
psychiatrist’s	alleged	negligence	in	aiding	the	patient	to	get	access	to	a	gun,	which	the	
patient	used	to	kill	a	third	person.	354	N.W.2d	25,	27–28	(Minn.	1984).	The	court	in	
Lundgren	emphasized	that	any	duty	 to	warn	potential	victims	would	be	 limited	to	
cases	where	the	patient	has	made	“specific	threats	against	identifiable	persons.”	Id.	at	
29	(citing	Cairl	v.	State,	323	N.W.2d	20,	25–26	(Minn.	1982)).	
	 	 Section	148.975	of	the	2018	Minnesota	Statutes	imposes	a	duty	on	the	lim-
ited	category	of	“licensee[s],”	defined	in	subdivision	1(d)	to	include	“practicum	psy-
chology	students,	predoctoral	psychology	interns,	and	individuals	who	have	earned	a	
doctoral	degree	in	psychology	and	are	in	the	process	of	completing	their	postdoctoral	
supervised	psychological	employment	in	order	to	qualify	for	licensure,”	to	make	“rea-
sonable	efforts”	to	warn	potential	victims	of	specific	threats	to	that	victim.	Subdivi-
sion	2	requires	“a	specific,	serious	threat	of	physical	violence	against	a	specific,	clearly	
identified	or	identifiable	potential	victim.”	MINN.	STAT.	§	148.975,	subdiv.	2	(2018).		
	 47.	 Fenrich	v.	Blake	Sch.,	920	N.W.2d	195,	201–02	(Minn.	2018).	
	 48.	 Id.	at	202.	
	 49.	 Id.	
	 50.	 Id.	
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The	 school’s	 argument	was	 based	 on	Gylten	 v.	 Swalboski,51	 an	
Eighth	 Circuit	 case	 applying	Minnesota	 law.	 In	 that	 case,	 a	 student	
football	player	on	a	cooperative	football	team	sponsored	by	two	sep-
arate	school	districts	caused	an	accident	while	driving	from	his	school,	
Climax,	to	the	other	school,	Fisher,	which	was	where	practice	was	to	
be	 held	 that	 day.52	 Pursuant	 to	 the	 cooperative	 agreement,	 each	
school	was	responsible	 for	 the	 transportation	of	 its	 students	 to	 the	
other	school	 for	practices.53	The	schools	used	buses	for	transporta-
tion,	but	because	of	a	mix-up	as	to	which	school	was	supposed	to	be	
hosting	the	practice	on	the	day	of	the	accident,	Timothy	Swalboski,	Jr.,	
a	junior,	drove	himself	and	another	teammate	to	practice	at	the	other	
school,	with	the	knowledge	of	his	coach.54	The	plaintiffs	argued	that	
the	 school	 districts	 “negligently	 breached	 their	 duty	 of	 supervision	
and	control	of	the	students	while	in	transport	to	football	practice.”55		
The	defendant	school	districts	moved	for	summary	judgment,	ar-
guing	that	they	did	not	owe	a	duty	to	non-students	who	might	be	in-
jured	by	 the	negligence	of	a	student	who	was	driving	 to	an	activity	
sponsored	by	the	schools.56	The	Eighth	Circuit	concluded	that	there	
was	no	special	relationship	between	the	school	and	the	plaintiffs,	and	
that	the	school	could	not,	under	the	facts,	anticipate	that	they	would	
be	injured.57	There	was	no	indication	that	the	school	had	knowledge	
that	there	would	be	a	risk	of	injury	to	the	third	parties	under	these	
circumstances,	prompting	the	court	to	“believe	that	the	Minnesota	Su-
preme	 Court	 would	 likely	 reach	 the	 conclusion	 of	 not	 extending	 a	
school	 district’s	 liability	 to	 non-student	 third	 parties	who	 lack	 any	
connection	to	the	school.”58		
The	Minnesota	Supreme	Court,	 in	Fenrich	v.	Blake	School,	 read	
Gylten	as	considering	only	 the	 issue	of	whether	 there	was	a	special	
relationship	between	the	school	and	the	general	public	that	would	im-
pose	 a	 duty	 on	 the	 school.59	 According	 to	 the	 supreme	 court,	 the	
	
	 51.	 246	F.3d	1139	(8th	Cir.	2001).	
	 52.	 Id.	at	1141.		
	 53.	 Id.	at	1140.		
	 54.	 Id.	at	1140–41.		
	 55.	 Id.	at	1141.	
	 56.	 Id.	
	 57.	 Id.	at	1142,	1144.		
	 58.	 Id.	at	1144.	
	 59.	 920	N.W.2d	195,	202	(Minn.	2018)	(citing	Gylten,	246	F.3d	at	1143).		
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Eighth	Circuit	did	not	consider	the	“own	conduct”	exception	and	it	did	
not	create	a	categorical	exclusion	for	schools	from	tort	liability.60	
The	plaintiff	in	Fenrich	argued	that	there	was	a	special	relation-
ship	between	the	Fenrichs	and	school	under	in	loco-parentis	and	com-
mon-carrier	 theories.61	 The	 supreme	 court	 rejected	 both	 argu-
ments.62		
1.	In	Loco	Parentis	
As	 the	 Third	 Restatement	 notes,	 the	 relationship	 between	 a	
school	and	student	is	based	on	the	school’s	status	as	a	possessor	of	
land	that	has	opened	its	premises	to	a	substantial	portion	of	the	public	
population,	as	a	custodian	of	its	students,	and	because	it	acts	partially	
in	the	place	of	the	students’	parents.63	The	duties	are	overlapping.	
The	supreme	court,	in	Fenrich,	rejected	the	argument	that	there	
is	 a	 special	 relationship	 based	 on	 an	 in	 loco-parentis	 theory.64	 The	
court	explained	that	it	has	“never	held	that	a	school	generally	stands	
in	loco	parentis	with	its	students”	and	declined	to	do	so	in	Fenrich.65	
However,	Minnesota	cases	may	not	make	it	quite	that	clear.	There	are	
acknowledgements	of	the	in	loco-parentis	theory	in	the	school	setting,	
and,	 in	 some	cases,	whispers	of	 the	 concept	without	 the	use	of	 the	
term.66		
	
	 60.	 Id.		
	 61.	 Id.		
	 62.	 Id.	
	 63.	 RESTATEMENT	(THIRD)	OF	TORTS	§	40	CMT.	L	(AM.	LAW	INST.	2010).	
	 64.	 920	N.W.2d	at	202–03.	
	 65.	 Id.	 (citing	Hollingsworth	v.	 State,	No.	A14-1874,	2015	WL	4877725,	at	 *4	
(Minn.	Ct.	App.	Aug.	17,	2015))	(“Hollingsworth	concedes	that	schools	generally	do	
not	owe	a	duty	of	care	in	loco	parentis	to	protect	students.”).	The	court,	citing	London	
Guarantee	&	Acc.	Co.	v.	Smith,	242	Minn.	211,	64	N.W.2d	781,	784	(1954),	noted	that	
“[i]n	loco	parentis	.	.	.	‘refers	to	a	person	who	has	put	himself	in	the	situation	of	a	lawful	
parent	by	assuming	the	obligations	 incident	to	the	parental	relation	without	going	
through	the	formalities	necessary	to	legal	adoption.’”	Fenrich,	920	N.W.2d	at	202.	
	 66.	 Another	unpublished	court-of-appeals	opinion,	Vistad	v.	Board.	of	Regents	of	
the	 University	 of	 Minnesota,	 acknowledges	 the	 concept.	 No.	 A04-2161,	 2005	 WL	
1514633,	at	*2	n.1	(Minn.	Ct.	App.	June	28,	2005)	(“Because	a	school	district	ordinar-
ily	is	in	loco	parentis	with	its	minor	students,	its	duty	is	greater	than	that	of	a	univer-
sity	to	its	adult	students.”).	The	Minnesota	Supreme	Court	has	acknowledged	the	rule,	
although	it	did	not	use	the	term	“in	loco	parentis.”	See,	e.g.,	Verhel	v.	Indep.	Sch.	Dist.	
No.	709,	359	N.W.2d	579,	593	(Minn.	1984)	(Simonett,	J.,	dissenting	in	part)	(citations	
omitted)	(“Ordinarily,	a	school	district’s	duty	to	supervise	is	based	on	the	fact	that	
parents	have	relinquished	custody	of	their	children	to	the	school	for	school	activities	
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Sheehan	v.	St.	Peter’s	Catholic	School67	is	a	key	case	in	the	devel-
opment	of	a	school’s	obligation	to	protect	its	students.68	In	Sheehan,	
an	eighth	grader	lost	the	sight	in	her	right	eye	as	a	result	of	a	three-to-
four-minute	 pebble-throwing	 incident	 during	 recess.69	 At	 the	
teacher’s	direction,	she	was	sitting	with	a	group	of	twenty	girls	on	the	
side	of	an	athletic	field	being	used	by	eighth-grade	boys	who	threw	
pebbles	at	the	girls.	The	trial	court	instructed	the	jury	that:	
It	is	the	duty	of	a	school	to	use	ordinary	care	and	to	protect	
its	students	from	injury	resulting	from	the	conduct	of	other	
students	 under	 circumstances	where	 such	 conduct	would	
reasonably	 have	 been	 foreseen	 and	 could	 have	 been	 pre-
vented	by	the	use	of	ordinary	care.	There	is	no	requirement	
of	constant	supervision	of	all	the	movements	of	pupils	at	all	
times.70	
The	jury	found	for	the	plaintiff	and	awarded	her	$50,000	in	dam-
ages.71	The	supreme	court	affirmed.72	
After	surveying	decisions	from	several	other	jurisdictions,73	the	
court	distilled	the	following	standard:	
	
and,	consequently,	the	school	is	charged	with	the	duty	of	protecting	the	children	while	
in	its	charge.”).	
	 67.	 291	Minn.	1,	188	N.W.2d	868	(1971).	
	 68.	 See	S.W.	v.	Spring	Lake	Park	Sch.	Dist.	No.	16,	592	N.W.2d	870,	874	(Minn.	
1999)	 (calling	Sheehan	 v.	 St.	 Peter’s	 Catholic	 School,	 291	Minn.	 1,	 188	N.W.2d	868	
(1971),	“the	seminal	school	duty	case”).	
	 69.	 Sheehan,	291	Minn.	at	3,	188	N.W.2d	at	870.	
	 70.	 Id.		
	 71.	 Id.	at	869.		
	 72.	 Id.	at	871.		
	 73.	 The	 defendant,	 in	 Sheehan,	 relied	 on	Woodsmall	 v.	 Mount	 Diablo	 Unified	
School	District,	10	Cal.	Rptr.	447	(Cal.	Ct.	App.	1961);	Wilber	v.	City	of	Binghamton,	66	
N.Y.S.2d	250	(N.Y.	App.	Div.	1946),	aff’d,	73	N.E.2d	263	(N.Y.	1947);	Ohman	v.	Board.	
of	Education,	90	N.E.2d	474	(N.Y.	1949);	and	Nestor	v.	City	of	New	York,	211	N.Y.S.2d	
975	(N.Y.	Sup.	Ct.	1961).	291	Minn.	at	3,	188	N.W.2d	at	870.	The	Minnesota	Supreme	
Court	 distinguished	 those	 cases	 because	 “the	 injuries	were	 inflicted	 suddenly	 and	
without	warning	and	 in	such	a	manner	the	courts	 felt	supervision	would	not	have	
prevented	them.”	Id.	The	court	also	contrasted	Christofides	v.	Hellenic	Eastern	Ortho-
dox	Christian	Church,	227	N.Y.S.2d	946	(N.Y.	Mun.	Ct.	1962),	where	liability	was	im-
posed	when	student	was	stabbed	by	another	student	in	a	classroom	that	was	unsu-
pervised	for	twenty-five	minutes,	with	Nash	v.	Rapides	Parish	School	Board.,	188	So.2d	
508	(La.	Ct.	App.	1966),	where	no	liability	attached	when	teacher	could	not	have	an-
ticipated	or	prevented	one	child	striking	another	in	the	eye.	Sheehan,	291	Minn.	at	5,	
188	N.W.2d	at	871.	However,	the	court	stated	that	it	subscribed	to	the	position	taken	
by	the	California	Court	of	Appeals	in	Ziegler	v.	Santa	Cruz	City	High	School	District.,	
335	P.2d	709	(Cal.	Ct.	App.	1959),	“which	held	that	 in	order	to	recover	damages	a	
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We	are	of	the	opinion	that	the	better	reasoned	cases	permit	
recovery	 if	 there	 is	evidence	 from	which	a	 jury	could	 find	
that	 supervision	would	probably	have	prevented	 the	acci-
dent.	We	need	not	decide	whether	there	may	be	recovery	for	
lack	of	supervision	where	a	child	is	injured	by	sudden,	un-
anticipated	action	of	a	fellow	student.	This	is	not	such	a	case.	
Here,	the	pebble	throwing	continued	for	3	or	4	minutes	be-
fore	plaintiff	was	injured.	Under	such	circumstances,	a	jury	
could	properly	 find	that	had	the	teacher	been	present	she	
would	 have	 put	 a	 stop	 to	 this	 dangerous	 activity	 before	
plaintiff	was	struck.74	
The	court	also	held	that	a	plaintiff	is	only	required	to	prove	that	
“a	general	danger	was	foreseeable	and	that	supervision	would	have	
prevented	the	accident”	that	occurred.75	Proof	that	the	particular	ac-
cident	was	foreseeable	is	unnecessary.76		
The	takeaway	from	the	court’s	decisions	is	that	a	special	relation-
ship	exists	between	a	school	and	its	students	that	justifies	imposing	
liability	on	the	school	for	inadequate	supervision	that	results	in	injury	
to	another	student.	That	duty	does	not	extend	to	third	persons.	
2.	Common	Carrier	
The	common	carrier	 theory	 in	Fenrich	was	based	on	 the	argu-
ment	that	T.M.’s	car	was,	in	effect,	a	“school	bus,”	which	made	it	a	com-
mon	carrier.77	However,	 the	statutory	definition	of	“school	bus”	ex-
cludes	motor	vehicles	of	the	type	T.M.	was	driving;78	the	court	quickly	
disposed	of	the	claim	on	statutory	grounds.79	
	
student	need	only	prove	that	a	general	danger	was	foreseeable	and	that	supervision	
would	have	prevented	the	accident”	and	that	“[i]t	was	not	necessary	to	prove	that	the	
particular	accident	which	occurred	was	foreseeable.”	Sheehan,	291	Minn.	at	4–5,	188	
N.W.2d	at	871.	
	 74.	 Id.	at	871.	
	 75.	 Id.		
	 76.	 Id.		
	 77.	 920	N.W.2d	at	203	(Minn.	2018).	
	 78.	 Id.	 (citing	 MINN.	 STAT.	 §	 169.011,	 subdiv.	 71(a)	 (2016))	 (explaining	 that	
“school	bus”	excluded	“a	vehicle	.	.	.	qualifying	as	a	type	III	vehicle	under	paragraph	
(h),”	and	thus	excluded	passenger	cars	of	the	type	T.M.	was	driving).		
	 79.	 Id.	
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III.	DUTY	AND	FORESEEABLE	RISKS	
There	may	also	be	a	duty	where	“the	defendant’s	own	conduct	
creates	a	 foreseeable	risk	of	 injury	 to	a	 foreseeable	plaintiff.”80	The	
supreme	court	agreed	with	the	district	court	and	the	court	of	appeals	
in	 concluding	 that	 “the	 school	went	beyond	passive	 inaction	by	as-
suming	supervision	and	control	over	its	athletic	team’s	trip	to	Sioux	
Falls.”81	 The	 first	 step	 in	 the	 supreme	 court’s	 determination	 of	
whether	the	school	owed	a	duty	to	the	Fenrichs	was	finding	that	the	
school	assumed	supervision	and	control	over	the	trip.82	The	second	
step	turned	on	the	foreseeability	of	risk.83	
A.	Assumption	of	Supervision	and	Control	and	the	
Misfeasance/Nonfeasance	Issue	
The	issue	of	supervision	and	control	in	the	case	was	linked	to	the	
issue	of	whether	the	school’s	action	constituted	misfeasance	sufficient	
to	impose	a	duty	to	use	reasonable	care	on	the	school.	To	better	un-
derstand	the	court’s	approach	to	the	problem	in	Fenrich,	it	is	helpful	
to	first	take	a	broader	look	at	the	misfeasance/nonfeasance	issue.	
In	tort	law,	there	is	ordinarily	no	duty	to	act	unless	the	defendant	
has	created	a	risk	of	 injury.84	Recent	Minnesota	decisions	hold	that	
there	is	a	duty	if	the	defendant	creates	a	foreseeable	risk	of	injury	to	
a	 foreseeable	plaintiff.85	There	 is	no	duty	 if	 the	defendant	does	not	
create	a	risk	of	 injury,86	unless	the	plaintiff	can	establish	one	of	the	
	
	 80.	 Id.	at	202	(quoting	Domagala	v.	Rolland,	805	N.W.2d	14,	23	(Minn.	2011)).	
The	“foreseeable	risk	of	injury	to	a	foreseeable	plaintiff”	appeared	for	the	first	time	in	
the	Domagala	case.	805	N.W.2d	at	23.	Under	Domagala,	duty	turns	on	the	creation	of	
a	foreseeable	risk	of	injury.	See	id.	
	 81.	 Id.	at	203.		
	 82.	 See	id.	at	203–05.		
	 83.	 See	id.	at	205–07.		
	 84.	 RESTATEMENT	 (THIRD)	OF	TORTS:	LIABILITY	 FOR	PHYSICAL	 AND	EMOTIONAL	HARM	§	
7(a)	(AM.	LAW	INST.	2010)	(“An	actor	ordinarily	has	a	duty	to	exercise	reasonable	care	
when	the	actor’s	conduct	creates	a	risk	of	physical	harm.”).	There	are,	however,	limi-
tations	on	duty.	Section	7	also	states	that	“[i]n	exceptional	cases,	when	an	articulated	
countervailing	principle	or	policy	warrants	denying	or	limiting	liability	in	a	particular	
class	of	cases,	a	court	may	decide	that	the	defendant	has	no	duty	or	that	the	ordinary	
duty	of	reasonable	care	requires	modification.”	Id.	§	7(b).	
	 85.	 See,	e.g.,	Doe	169	v.	Brandon,	845	N.W.2d	174,	178	(Minn.	2014);	Domagala,	
805	N.W.2d	at	23.	
	 86.	 Restatement	(Third)	of	Torts:	Liability	for	Physical	and	Emotional	Harm	§	
37	(Am.	Law	Inst.	2010).	
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exceptions	 to	 the	general	 rule	 that	 there	 is	no	duty	 in	nonfeasance	
cases.		
The	line	between	misfeasance	and	nonfeasance	may	seem	clear.	
If	the	defendant	doesn’t	act	(nonfeasance)	there	is	no	duty.	If	the	de-
fendant	does	act	 and	 creates	 a	 (foreseeable)	 risk	of	 injury	 (misfea-
sance),	 there	 is	a	duty	 to	act.	The	 line	 isn’t	so	bright	 in	application,	
however,	and	focusing	just	on	whether	there	is	misfeasance	or	non-
feasance	can	be	misleading.	The	issue	is	not	whether		
reasonable	care	entails	the	commission	or	omission	of	a	spe-
cific	act	.	.	.	.	For	example,	a	failure	to	employ	an	automobile’s	
brakes	or	a	 failure	 to	warn	about	a	 latent	danger	 in	one’s	
product	is	not	a	case	of	nonfeasance	governed	by	the	rules	
in	this	Chapter,	because	in	these	cases	the	entirety	of	the	ac-
tor’s	 conduct	 (driving	an	automobile	or	 selling	a	product)	
created	a	risk	of	harm.	This	 is	so	even	though	the	specific	
conduct	alleged	to	be	a	breach	of	the	duty	of	reasonable	care	
was	itself	an	omission.87	
The	supreme	court’s	decision	in	Harper	v.	Herman88	is	a	good	ex-
ample	of	the	impact	of	a	narrow	focus	on	only	the	failure	to	act.	The	
plaintiff	 in	 the	case	was	 injured	when	he	dove	off	a	boat	owned	by	
Herman	into	shallow	water	off	a	lake	island.89	Harper	was	unaware	
that	the	water	was	shallow,	but	Herman,	an	experienced	boater,	knew	
that	it	was.90	Harper	was	one	of	four	guests	on	the	boat.91	He	was	in-
vited	by	another	guest,	but	not	by	Herman.92	The	district	court	held	
that	Herman	owed	no	duty	to	warn	Harper	that	the	water	was	shal-
low.93	The	court	of	appeals	reversed,	holding	that	Herman	“voluntar-
ily	assumed	a	duty	to	exercise	reasonable	care	when	he	allowed	[Har-
per]	to	embark	on	his	boat,”	and	that	he	“owed	a	duty	of	care	to	warn	
[Harper]	not	 to	dive	 from	the	boat	because	he	knew	the	water	was	
dangerously	shallow.”94	
The	Minnesota	Supreme	Court	reversed.95	The	court	framed	the	
issue	as	“whether	a	boat	owner	who	is	a	social	host	owes	a	duty	of	
care	 to	warn	 a	 guest	 on	 the	 boat	 that	 the	water	 is	 too	 shallow	 for	
	
	 87.	 Id.	§	37	cmt.	c.		
	 88.	 499	N.W.2d	472	(Minn.	1993).	
	 89.	 Id.	at	474.		
	 90.	 Id.	at	473.		
	 91.	 Id.		
	 92.	 Id.		
	 93.	 Id.	at	474.	
	 94.	 Harper	v.	Herman,	487	N.W.2d	908,	910	(Minn.	Ct.	App.	1992).	
	 95.	 Herman,	499	N.W.2d	at	475.	
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diving.”96	Harper	argued	that	Herman	owed	him	a	duty	to	warn	that	
the	water	was	shallow	because	of	Harper’s	inexperience	as	a	swim-
mer	and	diver	and	Herman’s	as	a	veteran	boater.97	Harper	argued	that	
under	those	circumstances,	Herman	should	have	known	that	Harper	
needed	his	protection.98	
The	 supreme	court	began	with	 the	assumption	 that	 this	was	a	
nonfeasance	case	and	that	the	only	way	to	impose	a	duty	on	Herman	
was	to	establish	a	special	relationship	between	Herman	and	Harper.99	
The	court	held	that	there	was	no	recognized	special	relationship	and	
that	Herman,	therefore,	did	not	owe	a	duty	to	warn	Harper.100	Her-
man’s	knowledge	of	the	dangerous	condition	alone	was	insufficient	to	
establish	liability.101	
The	court’s	focus	on	the	failure-to-warn	issue	immediately	fore-
closed	any	analysis	of	the	surrounding	circumstances.102	Herman	did	
not	warn	Harper	 of	 the	 danger	 of	 diving	 at	 the	 spot	where	 he	 had	
moored	the	boat.103	Had	he	been	one	of	the	other	passengers,	it	seems	
clear	that	he	would	not	have	owed	a	duty,	but	he	was	an	experienced	
boater	and	he	moored	the	boat	in	an	area	where	the	water	was	shal-
low.104	Viewing	the	facts	in	their	entirety,	it	is	arguable	that	Herman	
created	a	risk	of	injury	when	he	put	the	boat	in	that	position	and	knew	
that	Harper	would	be	swimming	there.	In	that	view,	he	facilitated	the	
injury	rather	than	simply	failing	to	prevent	it.105	
Focusing	on	the	facts	in	their	entirety	provides	a	clearer	way	of	
viewing	the	issue.	The	supreme	court	did	that	in	Fenrich,	using	Verhel	
	
	 96.	 Id.	at	474.	
	 97.	 Id.		
	 98.	 Id.		
	 99.	 Id.		
	 100.	 Id.	
	 101.	 Id.	at	475.	
	 102.	 See	id.		
	 103.	 Id.	at	474.	
	 104.	 Id.		
	 105.	 This	is	a	recurring	problem.	The	take-home	asbestos	cases	are	good	exam-
ples	of	how	the	issue	should	be	resolved.	In	those	cases,	a	worker	brings	home	cloth-
ing	embedded	with	asbestos	fibers.	Another	member	of	the	household	contracts	as-
bestosis	or	mesothelioma	because	of	exposure	to	the	asbestos.	The	issue	is	whether	
the	company	employing	the	worker	has	a	duty	to	warn	family	members	of	the	danger.	
Failure	to	do	so	is	nonfeasance,	or	so	the	argument	goes,	but	the	company	has	affirm-
atively	created	a	risk	of	injury	in	exposing	the	family	members	to	the	asbestos.	See	
Flint	v.	Langer	Transp.	Corp.,	762	F.Supp.2d	735	(D.	N.J.	2011);	Satterfield	v.	Breeding	
Insulation	Co.,	266	S.W.3d	347	(Tenn.	2008).		
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v.	Independent	School	Dist.	No.	709106	as	its	template	for	the	analysis	
of	 the	 supervision	 issue.107	 The	 plaintiff	 in	 Verhel,	 a	 Denfeld	 High	
School	cheerleader,	was	injured	in	a	motor	vehicle	accident	while	rid-
ing	in	a	van	with	several	other	cheerleaders	that	was	driven	by	one	of	
the	 cheerleaders.108	 At	 the	 time	 of	 the	 accident,	 one	 week	 before	
school	started,	the	cheerleaders	were	putting	up	banners	in	the	early	
morning	hours	on	homes	of	the	school’s	football	players	in	anticipa-
tion	 of	 the	 first	 game	 of	 the	 season.109	 Verhel	 sued	 another	 cheer-
leader	who	was	driving	a	van	in	which	Verhel	and	several	other	cheer-
leaders	were	passengers.110	
The	key	issue	in	the	case	was	whether	the	school	district	had	as-
sumed	supervision	and	control	over	cheerleading	at	the	high	school,	
which	would	then	require	it	to	provide	regulations	and	supervision	
for	members	of	the	cheerleading	squad	while	they	were	engaged	in	
cheerleading	activities.111	Following	a	jury	verdict	for	the	plaintiff,	the	
court	held	on	appeal	that	the	facts	were	sufficient	to	justify	the	ver-
dict.112		
The	court	in	Fenrich	saw	the	facts	in	Verhel	as	“strikingly	similar”	
to	the	Fenrich	facts,	concluding	that	“viewed	in	a	light	most	favorable	
	
	 106.	 359	N.W.2d	579	(Minn.	1984).		
	 107.	 Fenrich,	920	N.W.2d	at	203.	The	court	in	Verhel	in	turn	used	Raleigh	v.	Inde-
pendent	School	District	No.	625,	275	N.W.2d	572	(Minn.	1978),	as	its	template.	Verhel,	
359	N.W.2d	at	589–90.	The	minor	plaintiff	in	Raleigh,	a	student	at	Central	High	School	
in	St.	Paul,	was	slashed	by	another	student	after	an	off-campus	showing	of	the	film	
“KING,	A	Filmed	Record,	Montgomery	to	Memphis,”	during	Black	History	Month	and	
at	a	time	of	racial	tension	at	the	school.	Raleigh,	275	N.W.2d	at	573.	A	jury	found	the	
school	district	 liable	for	negligently	supervising	and	organizing	the	students.	In	af-
firming,	the	supreme	court	concluded	that	“although	the	school	district	might	not	be	
liable	for	sudden,	unanticipated	misconduct	of	fellow	students,	it	is	liable	for	sudden,	
foreseeable	misconduct	which	probably	could	have	been	prevented	by	the	exercise	
of	ordinary	care.”	Id.	at	576.	The	court	thought	that	the	facts	of	the	case	made	it	“ex-
tremely	close,”	but	that	the	evidence	showing	the	school	district’s	awareness	of	the	
racial	tension	at	the	school	and	the	lack	of	supervision	and	organization	of	the	stu-
dents,	the	court	decided	that	it	could	not	hold	as	a	matter	of	law	that	the	jury	was	not	
justified	in	finding	a	breach	of	duty	and	in	finding	causation.	Id.	Had	there	been	rea-
sonable	supervision,	the	sudden	injuries	might	have	been	prevented	by	either	inter-
rupting	it	or	deterring	it	from	happening	at	all.	Id.	
	 108.	 Verhel,	359	N.W.2d	at	583.		
	 109.	 Id.		
	 110.	 Id.	
	 111.	 Id.	at	586–87.	
	 112.	 Id.	at	588–90.	
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to	 Fenrich,	 a	 reasonable	 fact-finder	 could	 find	 that	 they	 constitute	
misfeasance.”113	
In	analyzing	the	issue	of	whether	there	was	misfeasance	by	the	
school,	the	court	focused	on	a	list	of	specific	facts	in	the	case	that	sug-
gested	affirmative	action	by	the	school:		
The	head	coach	strongly	encouraged	the	entire	team	to	par-
ticipate	in	the	Nike	meet	and	14	team	members	registered.	
The	 assistant	 coach	 paid	 the	 bulk	 registration	 fee.	 The	
coaches	were	active	in	preparation	for	the	meet,	 including	
the	 assistant	 coach	 attending	 one	 of	 the	practices	 and	 re-
cruiting	a	volunteer	coach	to	run	them.	
								The	 assistant	 coach	 also	 took	 active	 responsibility	 for	
coordinating	 transportation	 to,	 and	 lodging	 at,	 the	 Nike	
meet.	As	he	put	 it,	 “we	all	 drove	down	as	 a	 team.”	He	ex-
pressly	approved	the	plan	to	have	T.M.—and	not	T.M.’s	fa-
ther	or	another	adult—drive	team	members	and	the	volun-
teer	coach	more	than	200	miles	to	Sioux	Falls.	The	assistant	
coach	decided	that	 the	volunteer	coach,	a	 teenager,	would	
ride	with	T.M.	But	he	did	not	give	the	volunteer	coach	any	
safety	 instructions—such	as	to	sit	 in	the	front	seat,	 to	pay	
attention	(rather	than	be	distracted	by	electronic	devices),	
and	to	make	sure	that	T.M.	drove	responsibly.	Nor	did	the	
assistant	coach	give	any	instructions	to	T.M.,	except,	during	
a	break,	to	“keep	it	safe	and	keep	rolling.”114		
The	Fenrich	court	borrowed	Verhel’s	conclusion	that	this	sort	of	
driving	“behavior,	or	misbehavior,	by	unsupervised	students	is	to	be	
expected	and	is	precisely	the	harm	to	be	guarded	against	by	the	exer-
cise	of	the	school	district’s	supervision,”	and	rejected	the	dissent’s	ar-
gument	that	the	school’s	duty	should	be	limited	only	to	its	own	stu-
dents.115	 The	 court	 concluded	 that,	 on	 those	 facts,	 “a	 reasonable	
factfinder	could	conclude	that	the	school’s	own	conduct	was	misfea-
sant.”116	
IV.	DUTY	AND	FORESEEABILITY	
Misfeasance—creating	a	risk	of	injury—provides	part	of	the	ba-
sis	 for	the	duty	determination	under	Minnesota	 law,	but	the	risk	of	
	
	 113.	 Fenrich,	920	N.W.2d	at	204.	
	 114.	 Id.	at	199–200.		
	 115.	 Id.	at	205.	
	 116.	 Id.	at	204.	
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injury	 has	 to	 be	 foreseeable.	 The	 foreseeability	 issue,	 including	
whether	the	judge	or	jury	decides	it,	is	critical	to	that	determination.	
A.	The	Recent	Cases	
		 Montemayor	v.	Sebright	Products,	Inc.,117	and	Senogles	v.	Carl-
son,118	are	key	recent	cases	addressing	that	issue,	and	they	are	foun-
dational	for	the	court’s	consideration	of	the	issue	in	Fenrich.	In	each	
case,	one	involving	the	foreseeability	issue	in	a	products	liability	case	
and	the	other	a	case	involving	a	landowner’s	duty,	the	supreme	court	
concluded	that,	viewing	the	evidence	and	inferences	to	be	drawn	from	
it	in	favor	of	the	non-moving	parties,	summary	judgment	based	on	the	
conclusion	that	the	injuries	were	not	foreseeable	as	a	matter	of	law	
was	inappropriate.119		
It	 seems	 clear	 that	 the	 court	 is	not	 establishing	a	new	 rule	 for	
summary	 judgment	 cases	 involving	 the	 foreseeability	 issue,120	 but	
	
	 117.	 898	N.W.2d	623	(Minn.	2017).	
	 118.	 902	N.W.2d	38	(Minn.	2017).	For	an	analysis	of	Montemayor	and	Senogles	
and	the	foreseeability	issue,	see	Mike	Steenson,	Duty,	Foreseeability,	and	Montemayor	
v.	Sebright	Products	Inc.,	39	MITCHELL	HAMLINE	L.	J.	PUB.	POL’Y	&	PRAC.	31,	44–47	(2018).	
In	Warren	v.	Dinter,	No.	A17-0555,	2019	WL	1646469	(Minn.	Apr.	17,	2019),	a	medical	
negligence	case	the	supreme	court	held,	in	a	case	of	first	impression,	that	the	alleged	
decision	of	a	hospitalist	to	deny	admission	of	a	patient	to	a	hospital	could	constitute	
professional	 negligence,	 even	 absent	 a	 physician-patient	 relationship	 between	 the	
hospitalist	 and	 the	person	 for	whom	a	nurse-practitioner	 in	 a	different	 clinic	was	
seeking	admission.	The	court	noted	that	it	has	“never	held	that	such	a	relationship	is	
necessary	to	maintain	a	malpractice	action	under	Minnesota	law,”	and	that	“[t]o	the	
contrary:	when	there	is	no	express	physician-patient	relationship,	we	have	turned	to	
the	traditional	inquiry	of	whether	a	tort	duty	has	been	created	by	foreseeability	of	
harm.”	Id.	at	*4.	The	court	bracketed	its	analysis	with	two	cases	decided	eighty-five	
years	apart,	Skillings	v.	Allen,	143	Minn.	323,	173	N.W.	663	(1919)	(parents	of	daugh-
ter	with	scarlet	fever	were	told	that	she	was	not	contagious	and	that	they	could	visit	
her	in	the	hospital),	and	Molloy	v.	Meier,	679	N.W.2d	711,	717	(Minn.	2004)	(physi-
cians’	failure	to	disclose	that	a	key	test	to	determine	genetic	disorder	was	not	per-
formed	on	daughter	with	genetic	disorder).	Those	cases,	said	the	court,	“teach	us	that	
a	duty	arises	between	a	physician	and	an	identified	third	party	when	the	physician	
provides	medical	advice	and	it	is	foreseeable	that	the	third	party	will	rely	on	that	ad-
vice.”	2019	WL	1646469,	at	*5.	
	 119.	 Senogles,	902	N.W.2d	at	48;	Montemayor,	898	N.W.2d	at	633.	
	 120.	 The	Minnesota	 cases	 are	 sprinkled	with	 the	 “close	 cases”	 rubric.	See,	 e.g.,	
Bjerke	 v.	 Johnson,	 742	N.W.2d	 660,	 667–68	 (Minn.	 2007);	 Lundgren	 v.	 Fultz,	 354	
N.W.2d	25,	28	(Minn.	1984).	But	even	without	the	term	“close	cases,”	a	careful	sifting	
of	the	facts	is	nothing	new.	See	Ill.	Farmers	Ins.	Co.	v.	Tapemark	Co.,	273	N.W.2d	630,	
637–38	(Minn.	1978).	At	times,	the	Minnesota	Supreme	Court	has	expressed	concern	
about	leaving	the	foreseeability	issue	to	juries.	See,	e.g.,	Cooney	v.	Hooks,	535	N.W.2d	
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rather	an	approach	that	more	clearly	gives	the	benefit	of	the	doubt	to	
the	 injured	 plaintiff	 in	 cases	 that	 are	 on	 the	 fence.	 The	 court’s	 ap-
proach	in	Montemayor	and	Senogles	was	reinforced	in	a	recent	deci-
sion,	Henson	v.	Uptown	Drink,	LLC.121		
Henson	arose	out	of	the	death	of	an	off-duty	bar	employee	who	
slipped	and	hit	his	head	on	the	sidewalk	while	aiding	the	bar	manager	
in	escorting	an	intoxicated	and	disruptive	patron	from	the	bar.122	The	
plaintiff	 asserted	 innkeeper’s	 liability	and	Civil	Damages	Act	 claims	
against	the	bar.123	The	innkeeper’s	liability	claim	required	proof	that	
the	injury	was	foreseeable,124	which	the	district	court	held	involved	a	
close	question	of	fact.125	The	supreme	court	affirmed	that	holding.126	
The	 evidence	 was	 clear	 that	 the	 disruptive	 patrons	 had	 been	 in	
dustups	with	other	patrons	and	bar	employees	before	the	altercation	
that	led	to	Henson’s	death.127	The	court	concluded	that	the	“evidence	
is	enough	to	create	a	disputed	issue	of	material	fact	or	disputed	rea-
sonable	inferences	from	undisputed	facts.”128		
	
609,	612	(Minn.	1995);	Alholm	v.	Wilt,	394	N.W.2d	488,	491	n.	5	(Minn.	1986).	That	
ship	seems	to	have	sailed,	however.	
	 121.	 922	N.W.2d	185	(Minn.	2019).	
	 122.	 Id.	at	188–89.	
	 123.	 Id.	at	190.		
	 124.	 Id.		
	 125.	 Id.	at	192.	The	court	of	appeals	affirmed	the	district	court’s	finding	but	re-
versed	the	court’s	conclusion	that	the	plaintiff	assumed	the	risk	because	the	issue	of	
whether	the	defendant	enlarged	the	risk	to	the	plaintiff	presented	a	fact	question	for	
the	fact-finder.	Henson	v.	Uptown	Drink,	LLC,	906	N.W.2d	533,	540	(Minn.	Ct.	App.	
2017).	 The	 supreme	 court	 reversed	 that	 determination,	 holding	 that	 primary	 as-
sumption	of	risk	did	not	apply	in	innkeeper	liability	cases.	Henson,	922	N.W.2d	at	191.	
Coupled	with	its	same-day	decision	in	the	skiing	accident	case	of	Soderberg	v.	Ander-
son,	922	N.W.2d	200	(Minn.	2019),	the	court	narrowly	confined	the	doctrine	of	pri-
mary	assumption	of	risk	to	cases	involving	inherently	dangerous	sporting	activities.	
See	id.	at	206.	
	 126.	 Henson,	922	N.W.2d	at	192.	The	court	explained	that	the	innkeeper	liability	
theory	requires	proof	of	four	elements:	“(1)	notice	of	the	offending	party’s	‘vicious	or	
dangerous	propensities’	by	‘some	act	or	threat,’	(2)	adequate	opportunity	for	the	inn-
keeper	to	protect	the	injured	patron,	(3)	failure	on	the	part	of	the	innkeeper	to	take	
reasonable	steps	 to	do	so,	and	(4)	 foreseeable	 injury.	 Id.	 at	190	(quoting	Boone	v.	
Martinez,	567	N.W.2d	508,	510	(Minn.	1997)).	
	 127.	 Id.	at	192–93.		
	 128.	 Id.	at	193.	
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B.	Foreseeability	in	Fenrich	
The	Minnesota	Court	of	Appeals	in	Fenrich	drew	the	line	in	con-
cluding	that	the	school	did	not	owe	a	duty	to	the	plaintiffs	because	the	
accident	was	not	foreseeable	as	a	matter	of	law.129	The	Minnesota	Su-
preme	Court	drew	the	line	in	a	different	place	and	reversed.130		
The	court	launched	its	discussion	of	the	foreseeability	issue	with	
a	nod	to	the	familiar	standards	the	court	has	used	in	other	cases.	The	
court	looked	to	Foss	v.	Kincade	for	the	proposition	that	in	“determin-
ing	whether	a	danger	 is	 foreseeable,	 [the	court]	 ‘look[s]	at	whether	
the	specific	danger	was	objectively	reasonable	to	expect,	not	simply	
whether	 it	was	within	 the	 realm	of	any	conceivable	possibility.’”131	
The	key	question	is	whether	foreseeability	is	a	question	for	the	court	
or	for	the	jury.132	The	court	has	consistently	taken	the	position	that,	
while	duty	is	a	question	of	law	for	the	court,	foreseeability	is	a	ques-
tion	for	the	trier	of	fact	in	close	cases.133	
Because	 summary	 judgment	was	granted	 for	 the	defendant	on	
the	foreseeability	issue,	the	court	viewed	the	evidence	and	reasonable	
inferences	to	be	drawn	from	the	evidence	in	the	plaintiff’s	favor.134		
The	court	listed	the	key	facts,	on	both	sides	of	the	issue:	
• T.M.’s	parents	said	that	they	were	comfortable	in	having	
T.M.,	a	licensed	driver,	drive	to	the	meet.	
• There	was	no	evidence	that	T.M.	had	any	history	of	im-
proper	driving.	
• T.M.	 was	 following	 the	 vehicle	 driven	 by	 the	 assistant	
coach.	
• There	was	no	indication	that	T.M.	was	tired.135	
The	facts	also	indicated	that:	
• T.M.	 was	 only	 sixteen	 and	 had	 been	 licensed	 for	 six	
months,	 and	 was	 not	 legally	 entitled	 to	 drive	 multiple	
passengers	under	the	age	of	20.	
	
	 129.	 Fenrich	v.	Blake	Sch.,	901	N.W.2d	223,	234	(Minn.	Ct.	App.	2017).	
	 130.	 Fenrich	v.	Blake	Sch.,	920	N.W.2d	195,	207	(Minn.	2018).	
	 131.	 Id.	at	 205	 (quoting	 Foss	 v.	 Kincade,	 766	N.W.2d	 317,	 322	 (Minn.	 2009)).	
However,	there	are	other	formulations.	
	 132.	 Foss,	766	N.W.2d	at	322–23.		
	 133.	 See	Senogles	v.	 Carlson,	902	N.W.2d	38,	44	 (Minn.	2017);	Montemayor	v.	
Sebright	Prods.,	Inc.,	898	N.W.2d	623,	629	(Minn.	2017);	Domagala	v.	Rolland,	805	
N.W.2d	 14,	 27	 (Minn.	 2011);	 Bjerke	 v.	 Johnson,	 742	 N.W.2d	 660,	 667–68	 (Minn.	
2007).	
	 134.	 Fenrich,	920	N.W.2d	at	205.	
	 135.	 Id.	
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• The	assistant	coach	did	not	provide	him	with	any	direc-
tions	in	preparation	for	the	drive,	other	than	to	“keep	it	
safe	and	keep	rolling.”	
• The	assistant	coach	told	the	volunteer	coach	to	ride	with	
T.M.,	but	did	not	give	him	any	specific	directions	to	mon-
itor	T.M.’s	driving,	nor	was	the	volunteer	coach	told	to	sit	
in	the	front	seat	where	he	could	have	better	monitored	
T.M.’s	driving.		
• Absent	adult	supervision,	the	record	indicated	that	T.M.	
was	distracted	by	an	electronic	device	while	driving,	and	
that	may	have	been	the	cause	of	the	accident.136	
The	court	summed	up:	“A	reasonable	factfinder	could	conclude	
that,	 under	 these	 circumstances,	 it	 was	 foreseeable	 that	 a	 teenage	
driver	on	a	long	trip,	in	a	car	with	three	other	teenagers,	could	get	dis-
tracted	and	collide	with	another	driver.”137	The	court	saw	it	as	a	“close	
call,”138	but	that	the	issue	had	to	be	resolved	at	trial.	
V.	THE	TRIAL	
The	last	paragraph	of	the	Fenrich	opinion	provides	guideposts	for	
trial	of	the	case:	
As	we	did	in	two	recent	cases	involving	the	issue	of	duty	of	
care	in	the	context	of	summary	judgment,	we	decide	today	
that	foreseeability	is	at	least	a	close	call,	meaning	that	sum-
mary	judgment	on	the	element	of	duty	was	not	appropriate	
and	the	case	should	have	been	tried.	Nothing	in	our	decision	
prevents	 the	district	 court	 from	deciding	by	 trial	whether	
the	facts	show	misfeasance	or	nonfeasance.	And	nothing	in	
our	decision	prevents	 the	 school	 from	arguing	at	 trial	 the	
specific	elements	of	negligence:	that	the	school	had	no	duty	
because	its	conduct	did	not	create	a	foreseeable	risk	of	in-
jury	to	Fenrich;	that	the	school	did	not	breach	a	duty;	and	
that	the	school’s	conduct	was	not	the	direct	and	proximate	
cause	of	the	injuries.139	
First,	“foreseeability	is	at	least	a	close	call,”	making	it	an	issue	for	
trial.140	Second,	nothing	in	the	supreme	court’s	decision	prevents	the	
	
	 136.	 Id.	at	206.	
	 137.	 Id.	at	206	(citing	Bjerke,	742	N.W.2d	at	667).	
	 138.	 Id.	at	205	(citing	Senogles,	902	N.W.2d	at	48;	Montemayor,	898	N.W.2d	at	
633).	
	 139.	 Id.	at	206–07	(citations	omitted).	
	 140.	 Id.	at	207.		
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district	court	from	deciding	“by	trial	whether	the	facts	show	misfea-
sance	or	nonfeasance.”141	Third,	there	is	nothing	in	the	court’s	opinion	
that	“prevents	the	school	from	arguing	at	trial	the	specific	elements	of	
negligence.”142	That	 includes	 the	arguments	 that	 the	school	did	not	
owe	a	duty	to	the	Fenrichs	because	there	was	no	foreseeable	risk	of	
injury;	that	the	school	did	not	breach	its	duty;	and	“that	the	school’s	
conduct	was	not	 the	direct	and	proximate	cause	of	 the	 injuries.”143	
The	issues	are	either	for	trial,	to	be	resolved	at	trial,	or	by	trial.	Sum-
mary	 judgment	 is	 inappropriate,	but	 that	only	means	there	are	 fact	
issues	to	be	resolved	at	trial.	The	plaintiff	may	or	may	not	prevail,	but	
the	plaintiff	made	enough	of	a	showing	to	get	the	case	to	trial.144	But	
who	decides	the	issues,	judge	or	jury?	And	what	are	the	guidelines	if	
the	issues	are	for	jury	resolution?	
A.	Foreseeability	
The	issue	of	duty	is	a	question	of	law	for	the	court.145	A	court	may	
decide	that	there	 is	no	duty	for	reasons	of	principle	or	policy,146	or	
	
	 141.	 Id.	(emphasis	added).	
	 142.	 Id.	(emphasis	added).	
	 143.	 Id.	There	are	four	elements	to	a	negligence	claim	in	Minnesota:	duty,	breach	
of	duty,	proximate	cause,	and	damages.	See,	e.g.,	Bjerke	v.	Johnson,	742	N.W.2d	660,	
664	(Minn.	2007);	Gradjelick	v.	Hance,	646	N.W.2d	225,	230	(Minn.	2002);	Funchess	
v.	Cecil	Newman	Corp.,	632	N.W.2d	666,	672	(Minn.	2001);	Lubbers	v.	Anderson,	539	
N.W.2d	398,	401	(Minn.	1995).	
	 144.	 On	motions	for	summary	judgment,	courts	weigh	the	evidence,	determine	
witness	credibility,	resolve	factual	disputes,	or	decide	the	merits	of	the	case.	Foley	v.	
WCCO	Television,	Inc.,	449	N.W.2d	497,	506	(Minn.	Ct.	App.	1989).	As	the	supreme	
court	noted	in	Lundgren	v.	Fultz,	the	issue	of	whether	the	shooting	was	foreseeable	
presented	a	close	question	that	should	be	resolved	by	a	jury.	354	N.W.2d	25,	28	(Minn.	
1984).	Lundgren	involved	the	alleged	negligence	of	a	University	of	Minnesota	psychi-
atrist	for	recommending	to	University	police	that	they	return	handguns	to	one	of	his	
patients,	who	then	used	one	of	the	guns	in	a	random	shooting.	Id.	at	26–27.	The	court	
noted	that	“[i]t	may	be	that	plaintiff	will	be	unable	to	prove	a	case,	either	to	the	trial	
court	or	the	jury,	but	enough	of	a	showing	has	been	made	to	escape	a	summary	judg-
ment	motion.”	Id.	at	29.		
	 145.	 See	Domagala	v.	Rolland,	805	N.W.2d	14,	22	(Minn.	2011).	
	 146.	 Policy	issues	relating	to	duty	permeate	the	Minnesota	cases.	See	e.g.,	Funch-
ess,	632	N.W.2d	at	673	(discussing	landlord’s	duty	to	tenant);	K.A.C.	v.	Benson,	527	
N.W.2d	553,	561	(Minn.	1995)	(discussing	negligent	exposure	to	AIDS);	M.H.	v.	Cari-
tas	Fam.	Serv.,	488	N.W.2d	282,	287–88	(Minn.1992)	(discussing	negligent	misrepre-
sentation	by	an	adoption	agency);	Lundgren,	354	N.W.2d	at	27	(discussing	psychia-
trist’s	duty	to	control	conduct	of	a	patient);	Stadler	v.	Cross,	295	N.W.2d	552,	554-55	
(Minn.	1980)	(discussing	negligent	infliction	of	emotional	distress).	Stadler	is	a	good	
example	of	a	case	where	the	emotional	harm	was	inflicted	upon	the	parents	who	were	
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that	 an	 injury	 or	 accident	 is	 not	 foreseeable	 as	 a	matter	 of	 law.147	
However,	even	if	policy	hurdles	are	cleared,	there	may	be	factual	dis-
putes	that	have	to	be	resolved	before	liability	can	be	imposed.148	Fore-
seeability	is	one	of	those	issues.	
Foreseeability	becomes	a	 jury	 issue	 in	 close	cases.	This	 can	be	
handled	in	one	of	three	ways.	First,	there	could	be	a	specific	jury	in-
struction	 and	 correlative	 special	 verdict	 question	 on	 the	 issue	 that	
would	precede	a	jury’s	consideration	of	the	breach	issue.	Second,	the	
foreseeability	issue	could	be	a	specific	factor	for	the	jury	to	decide	in	
considering	the	breach	issue.	Third,	 the	 jury	could	be	 instructed	on	
the	general	negligence	 issue	and	asked	 to	 simply	consider	whether	
the	defendant	used	reasonable	care,	without	specific	mention	of	fore-
seeability.		
If	the	first	approach	is	followed,	a	finding	that	an	injury	or	acci-
dent	was	unforeseeable	might	be	conclusive	on	the	duty	issue,	but	a	
finding	that	the	injury	or	accident	is	foreseeable	would	not	be	conclu-
sive	 on	 the	 breach	 issue.	 The	 jury	 would	 still	 have	 to	 determine	
whether	 the	 defendant	 used	 reasonable	 care	 under	 the	 circum-
stances.149	
	
near	their	child	when	the	child	was	hit	by	a	truck.	295	N.W.2d	at	553.	The	issue	in	the	
case	was	whether	the	supreme	court	should	adopt	bystander	recovery	theory	 in	a	
negligent	 infliction	of	emotional	distress	case.	 Id.	While	the	emotional	harm	to	the	
bystander	 parents,	 who	were	 nearby	 when	 their	 five-year-old	 child	 was	 hit	 by	 a	
pickup	 truck,	 may	 have	 been	 foreseeable,	 the	 supreme	 court	 held	 that	 recovery	
should	be	limited	to	the	zone-of-danger	rule,	which	had	been	the	rule	in	Minnesota	
since	Purcell	v.	St.	Paul	City	Ry.	Co.,	48	Minn.	134,	50	N.W.	1034	(1892).	Stadler,	295	
N.W.2d	at	553.	
	 147.	 See	Foss	v.	Kincade,	766	N.W.2d	317,	323	(Minn.	2009)	(holding	it	is	unfore-
seeable	that	a	child	would	attempt	to	climb	a	bookcase	in	a	neighbor’s	home).	
	 148.	 See,	e.g.,	Huber	v.	Niagara	Mach.	and	Tool	Works,	430	N.W.2d	465,	467	(Minn.	
1988)	(citations	omitted)	(holding	a	manufacturer’s	duty	to	warn	is	a	question	of	law	
for	resolution	by	the	court,	but	 if	 there	 is	a	specific	 factual	dispute	concerning	the	
manufacturer’s	 awareness	 of	 a	 risk,	 the	 issue	 should	 be	 resolved	 by	 the	 jury);	
RESTATEMENT	(THIRD)	OF	TORTS:	LIABILITY	FOR	PHYSICAL	AND	EMOTIONAL	HARM	§	40	cmt.	e	
(AM.	LAW	INST.	2010)	(“If	disputed	historical	facts	bear	on	whether	the	relationship	
exists,	as	with	a	dispute	over	whether	a	plaintiff	was	a	paying	guest	in	a	hotel	or	was	
a	trespasser,	the	jury	should	resolve	the	factual	dispute	with	appropriate	alternative	
instructions.”).	As	another	example,	there	may	be	a	fact	question	as	to	whether	an	
entrant	on	land	is	a	trespasser.	The	entrant’s	status	will	be	determinative	of	the	duty	
issue.	Id.	§	50	cmt.	e,	Reporters’	Note.	
	 149.	 See	4	MNPRAC	CIVJIG	25.10	(6th	ed.	2014).	CIVJIG	25.10	is	the	standard	jury	
instruction	on	negligence.	See	id.	“Negligence”	is	defined	as	“the	failure	to	use	reason-
able	care.”	 Id.	The	 instruction	goes	on	 to	provide	 that	 there	 is	negligence	 “when	a	
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The	second	approach	would	require	a	modification	of	the	stand-
ard	jury	instruction	to	include	the	standard	factors	relating	to	breach.	
The	Third	Restatement	of	Torts	provides	that:	
A	person	acts	negligently	if	the	person	does	not	exercise	rea-
sonable	care	under	all	the	circumstances.	Primary	factors	to	
consider	in	ascertaining	whether	the	person’s	conduct	lacks	
reasonable	care	are	the	foreseeable	likelihood	that	the	per-
son’s	conduct	will	result	in	harm,	the	foreseeable	severity	of	
any	harm	that	may	ensue,	and	the	burden	of	precautions	to	
eliminate	or	reduce	the	risk	of	harm.150	
Including	those	factors	in	a	jury	instruction	would	be	consistent	
with	existing	Minnesota	case	 law.	For	example,	 in	Erickson	v.	Curtis	
Investment	Co.,	 the	 supreme	court	 concluded	 in	a	parking-ramp-as-
sault	case	that	the	negligence	issue	was	for	the	jury,	but	the	court	also	
held	that	the	jury	instruction	in	the	case	should	include	the	foreseea-
bility	issue:		
We	hold	that	the	duty	should	be	defined	and	explained	to	the	
jury	along	the	 following	 lines:	The	operator	or	owner	of	a	
parking	ramp	facility	has	a	duty	 to	use	reasonable	care	 to	
deter	criminal	activity	on	its	premises	which	may	cause	per-
sonal	 harm	 to	 customers.	 The	 care	 to	 be	 provided	 is	 that	
care	which	a	reasonably	prudent	operator	or	owner	would	
provide	under	like	circumstances.	Among	the	circumstances	
to	 be	 considered	 are	 the	 location	 and	 construction	 of	 the	
ramp,	 the	practical	 feasibility	 and	 cost	 of	 various	 security	
measures,	and	the	risk	of	personal	harm	to	customers	which	
the	owner	or	operator	knows,	or	in	the	exercise	of	due	care	
should	know,	presents	a	reasonable	likelihood	of	happening.	
In	this	connection,	the	owner	or	operator	is	not	an	insurer	
or	guarantor	of	the	safety	of	its	premises	and	cannot	be	ex-
pected	to	prevent	all	criminal	activity.	The	fact	that	a	crimi-
nal	assault	occurs	on	the	premises,	standing	alone,	is	not	ev-
idence	 that	 the	 duty	 to	 deter	 criminal	 acts	 has	 been	
breached.151	
	
person	 .	.	.	 [d]oes	something	a	 reasonable	person	would	not	do;	or	 .	.	.	 [f]ails	 to	do	
something	a	reasonable	person	would	do.”	Id.	
	 150.	 Restatement	(Third)	of	Torts:	Liability	for	Physical	and	Emotional	Harm	§	3	
(Am.	Law	Inst.	2010).	
	 151.	 447	N.W.2d	165,	169–70	(Minn.	1989).	There	are	other	examples.	In	Bilotta	
v.	Kelley	Co.,	Justice	Simonett	suggested	that	a	jury	might	be	instructed	on	design	de-
fect	as	follows:	
A	product	is	unsafely	designed	if,	by	reason	of	its	design,	the	product	is	in	a	defective	
condition	unreasonably	dangerous	to	the	user.	The	manufacturer	has	a	duty	to	use	
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Justice	 Simonett’s	 proposed	 instruction	 in	Bilotta	 v.	 Kelley	 Co.	
specifically	 includes	 the	 foreseeability	 issue.152	 Short	 of	 that,	 how-
ever,	the	general	jury	instruction	encompasses	foreseeability,	just	as	
it	encompasses	 the	other	 factors	 involved	 in	determining	breach	of	
duty.153		
The	third	alternative	is	to	simply	use	the	standard	instruction	on	
negligence	without	any	specific	mention	of	foreseeability.	The	court’s	
concern	in	its	“close	cases”	is	to	be	sure	the	issue	is	resolved	at	trial.154	
Foreseeability	will	be	the	subject	of	proof	and	argument.	Surviving	a	
motion	for	summary	judgment	on	the	issue	does	not	mean	that	fore-
seeability	will	not	be	the	subject	of	proof	and	argument	at	trial.	A	de-
fendant	may	move	 for	 judgment	as	a	matter	of	 law	 if	 the	plaintiff’s	
proof	is	deficient,	and	if	the	plaintiff	survives	that	motion,	the	defend-
ant	may	argue	that	the	injury	is	so	unanticipated	that	the	defendant	
should	not	be	considered	negligent	for	failure	to	guard	against	it.	
A	second	question	is	whether	there	has	to	be	a	specific	jury	in-
struction	on	the	misfeasance/nonfeasance	issue.	Here,	the	key	issue	
is	whether	the	defendant	acted	affirmatively	in	creating	a	risk	of	in-
jury.	In	Fenrich,	the	facts	at	the	summary	judgment	stage	were	suffi-
cient	 to	 justify	 resolving	 the	 misfeasance/nonfeasance	 issue	 at	
	
due	care	to	design	a	product	that	does	not	create	an	unreasonable	risk	of	harm	to	
anyone	who	is	likely	to	be	exposed	to	the	danger	when	the	product	is	put	to	its	in-
tended	use	or	to	any	unintended	yet	reasonably	foreseeable	use.	346	N.W.2d	616,	626	
n.2	(Minn.	1984)	(Simonett,	J.,	concurring	specially).	
In	Peterson	v.	Balach,	294	Minn.	161,	174,	199	N.W.2d	639,	648	n.7	(1972),	the	court	
suggested	that	a	jury	might	be	instructed	on	various	factors	to	determine	the	liability	
of	landowners	in	cases	involving	injuries	to	entrants	on	land:	“Among	the	factors	to	
be	considered	might	be	the	circumstances	under	which	the	entrant	enters	the	land	
(licensee	or	invitee);	foreseeability	or	possibility	of	harm;	duty	to	inspect,	repair,	or	
warn;	reasonableness	of	inspection	or	repair;	and	opportunity	and	ease	of	repair	or	
correction.”	
	 152.	 346	N.W.2d	at	626	n.2.	
	 153.	 The	Third	Restatement	of	Torts	provides	that:	
A	person	acts	negligently	if	the	person	does	not	exercise	reasonable	care	under	all	the	
circumstances.	Primary	factors	to	consider	in	ascertaining	whether	the	person’s	con-
duct	lacks	reasonable	care	are	the	foreseeable	likelihood	that	the	person’s	conduct	
will	result	in	harm,	the	foreseeable	severity	of	any	harm	that	may	ensue,	and	the	bur-
den	of	precautions	to	eliminate	or	reduce	the	risk	of	harm.	
Restatement	(Third)	of	Torts:	Liability	for	Physical	and	Emotional	Harm	§	3	(Am.	Law	
Inst.	2010).		
	 154.	 See,	e.g.,	Bjerke	v.	Johnson,	742	N.W.2d	660,	667–68	(Minn.	2007);	Lundgren	
v.	Fultz,	354	N.W.2d	25,	28	(Minn.	1984).	
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trial.155	Given	the	necessity	of	considering	the	totality	of	the	circum-
stances	in	resolving	the	issue,156	the	most	logical	assumption	is	that	
the	 issue	of	whether	 there	 is	misfeasance	or	nonfeasance	has	 to	be	
tested	by	a	motion	for	judgment	as	a	matter	of	law.	
The	factual	causation	issue	is	for	the	trier	of	fact	pursuant	to	the	
standard	 instructions	 defining	 direct	 cause,157	 but	 the	 proximate	
	
	 155.	 Fenrich	v.	Blake	Sch.,	920	N.W.2d	195,	207	(Minn.	2018).	
	 156.	 Satterfield	v.	Breeding	Insulation	Company,	266	S.W.3d	347	(Tenn.	2008),	is	
a	good	example	of	why	it	is	necessary	to	consider	the	totality	of	the	circumstances	in	
determining	 whether	 the	 case	 involves	misfeasance	 or	 nonfeasance.	 The	 case	 in-
volved	a	suit	by	the	estate	of	a	daughter	who	alleged	that	she	had	contracted	meso-
thelioma	from	repeated	exposure	to	her	father’s	asbestos-contaminated	work	clothes	
over	an	extended	period	of	time.	Id.	at	351–52.	The	defendant-employer	argued	that	
it	had	no	duty	to	her	to	prevent	her	exposure.	Id.	at	352.	The	court	summarized	the	
essential	issue:	
The	underlying	dispute	in	this	case	is	fundamentally	one	of	characterization	and	clas-
sification.	Has	Alcoa	engaged	in	an	affirmative	act	that	created	an	unreasonable	and	
foreseeable	risk	of	harm	to	Ms.	Satterfield?	If	Alcoa	did	create	such	a	risk	of	harm,	are	
there	countervailing	legal	principles	or	policy	considerations	that	warrant	determin-
ing	that	Alcoa	nevertheless	owed	no	duty	Ms.	Satterfield?	Or,	alternatively,	does	this	
case	involve	an	omission	by	Alcoa	in	failing	to	control	the	actions	of	Mr.	Satterfield,	
its	employee?	
Id.	at	355.	
The	Tennessee	Supreme	Court	relied	on	Prosser	and	Keeton’s	distinction	between	
misfeasance	and	nonfeasance:	
In	the	determination	of	the	existence	of	a	duty,	there	runs	through	much	of	the	law	a	
distinction	between	action	and	inaction.	.	.	.	[T]here	arose	very	early	a	difference,	still	
deeply	rooted	in	the	law	of	negligence,	between	“misfeasance”	and	“nonfeasance”—
that	is	to	say,	between	active	misconduct	working	positive	injury	to	others	and	pas-
sive	inaction	or	a	failure	to	take	steps	to	protect	them	from	harm.	The	reason	for	the	
distinction	may	be	said	to	lie	in	the	fact	that	by	‘misfeasance’	the	defendant	has	cre-
ated	a	new	risk	of	harm	to	the	plaintiff,	while	by	‘nonfeasance’	he	has	at	least	made	
his	situation	no	worse,	and	has	merely	failed	to	benefit	him	by	interfering	in	his	af-
fairs.	
Id.	at	356	(quoting	W.	Page	Keeton,	Prosser	and	Keeton	on	the	Law	of	Torts	§	56,	at	
373	(5th	ed.1984)).	
The	court	used	the	classic	example	of	a	driver	who	sees	a	pedestrian	in	a	crosswalk	
but	fails	to	brake	in	time	to	avoid	injuring	her.	Id.	at	357.	While	the	failure	to	apply	
the	brakes	is	an	omission,	the	driver	drove	the	car	negligently.	See	id.	It’s	misfeasance	
rather	than	nonfeasance.	Id.	(citing	John	C.P.	Goldberg	&	Benjamin	C.	Zipursky,	The	
Restatement	(Third)	and	the	Place	of	Duty	in	Negligence	Law,	54	VAND.	L.	REV.	657,	691	
(2001)).	The	court	concluded	that	“Alcoa	engaged	in	misfeasance	that	set	in	motion	a	
risk	of	harm	to	Ms.	Satterfield.”	Id.	at	364.	
	 157.	 The	pattern	instructions	define	“direct	cause”	as	“a	cause	that	had	a	substan-
tial	 part	 in	 bringing	 about	 the	 (collision)	 (accident)	 (event)	 (harm)	 (injury).”	 4	
MNPRAC	CIVJIG	27.10	(6th	ed.	2014).	
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cause	issue	does	present	problems	if	it	is	a	fact	issue	for	the	trier	of	
fact.	The	proximate	 cause	 issue	presents	 some	problems,	 given	 the	
lack	 of	 consistency	 in	 the	 proximate-cause	 standards	 the	 supreme	
court	has	used	in	its	decisions.	For	example,	in	1896,	Justice	Mitchell	
framed	it	this	way	in	Christianson:	
What	 a	man	may	 reasonably	 anticipate	 is	 important,	 and	
may	be	decisive,	in	determining	whether	an	act	is	negligent,	
but	is	not	at	all	decisive	in	determining	whether	that	act	is	
the	proximate	cause	of	an	injury	which	ensues.	If	a	person	
had	no	reasonable	ground	to	anticipate	that	a	particular	act	
would	 or	 might	 result	 in	 any	 injury	 to	 anybody,	 then,	 of	
course,	the	act	would	not	be	negligent	at	all;	but,	if	the	act	
itself	is	negligent,	then	the	person	guilty	of	it	is	equally	liable	
for	all	its	natural	and	proximate	consequences,	whether	he	
could	have	foreseen	them	or	not.	Otherwise	expressed,	the	
law	is	that	if	the	act	is	one	which	the	party	ought,	in	the	ex-
ercise	of	ordinary	care,	to	have	anticipated	was	liable	to	re-
sult	in	injury	to	others,	then	he	is	liable	for	any	injury	proxi-
mately	 resulting	 from	 it,	 although	 he	 could	 not	 have	
anticipated	the	particular	injury	which	did	happen.	Conse-
quences	which	follow	in	unbroken	sequence,	without	an	in-
tervening	efficient	cause,	from	the	original	negligent	act,	are	
natural	and	proximate;	and	for	such	consequences	the	orig-
inal	 wrongdoer	 is	 responsible,	 even	 though	 he	 could	 not	
have	foreseen	the	particular	results	which	did	follow.158	
But,	in	Lubbers	v.	Anderson,	a	1995	case,	the	Minnesota	Supreme	
Court	framed	the	proximate	cause	test	as	requiring	foresight:	
We	have	said	that	in	order	for	a	party’s	negligence	to	be	the	
proximate	cause	of	an	injury	“the	act	[must	be]	one	which	
the	party	ought,	in	the	exercise	of	ordinary	care,	to	have	an-
ticipated	was	likely	to	result	in	injury	to	others,	 .	.	.	though	
he	could	not	have	anticipated	the	particular	injury	which	did	
happen.”159		
In	George	v.	Estate	of	Baker,	 the	supreme	court	 recently	stated	
that	proximate	cause	means	that	the	negligent	act	must	have	been	“a	
	
	 158.	 Christianson	v.	Chicago,	St.	P.,	M.	&	O.	Ry.	Co.,	67	Minn.	94,	97,	69	N.W.	640,	
641	(1896).	The	supreme	court	has	reaffirmed	the	standard	several	times.	See,	e.g.,	
Kronzer	v.	First	Nat.	Bank	of	Minneapolis,	305	Minn.	415,	426,	235	N.W.2d	187,	194	
(1975);	Orwick	v.	Belshan,	304	Minn.	338,	349,	231	N.W.2d	90,	97	(1975);	Hilligoss	
v.	Cross	Cos.,	304	Minn.	546,	547,	228	N.W.2d	585,	586	(1975);	Dellwo	v.	Pearson,	
259	Minn.	452,	454–56,	107	N.W.2d	859,	861–62	(1961).	
	 159.	 Lubbers	v.	Anderson,	539	N.W.2d	398,	401	(Minn.	1995).	
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substantial	factor	in	the	harm’s	occurrence.”160	That	is	the	standard	
used	in	the	pattern	jury	instructions	on	proximate	cause,	although	the	
pattern	 instruction	 uses	 the	 term	 “direct	 cause.”161	 The	 court	 in	
George	rejected	the	“but	for”	standard	as	the	proximate	cause	stand-
ard	“because	‘[i]n	a	philosophical	sense,	the	causes	of	an	accident	go	
back	to	the	birth	of	the	parties	and	the	discovery	of	America.’”162	The	
court	 said,	 however,	 that	 while	 the	 defendant’s	 negligent	 conduct	
must	have	been	a	“substantial	factor”	in	the	injury,	it	also	had	to,	at	a	
minimum,	have	been	a	“but-for”	cause	of	the	plaintiff’s	injury.163	But-
for	causation	becomes	a	necessary	but	not	sufficient	condition	for	cau-
sation.164	The	relationship	of	the	“substantial	factor”	standard	to	de-
terminations	concerning	the	scope	of	a	defendant’s	responsibility	for	
the	consequences	of	negligent	conduct	is	not	clear.	
That	leaves	the	law	with	three	embedded	standards.	Sometimes,	
the	courts,	concerned	about	the	proximate	cause	issue,	will	conclude	
that	an	obvious	but-for	cause	of	an	injury	is	not	a	cause,	but	an	“occa-
sion”	for	the	injury.165	The	real	difficulty	is	that	Minnesota	law	lacks	a	
mechanism	for	resolving	issues	concerning	scope	of	liability.	Perhaps	
the	simplest	view	is	to	focus	on	the	negligent	acts	that	made	the	de-
fendant’s	acts	 tortious,	and	 then	asking	whether	 the	 injury	 that	oc-
curred	 is	 similar	 enough	 for	 the	defendant	 to	be	 responsible	 for	 it.	
That	is	the	position	taken	in	the	Third	Restatement	of	Torts.166	
	
	 160.	 724	N.W.2d	1,	10	(Minn.	2006).	The	Minnesota	Supreme	Court	reaffirmed	
this	as	the	test	for	proximate	cause	in	case	involving	Civil	Damages	Act	claims.	See	
Osborne	v.	Twin	Town	Bowl,	Inc.,	749	N.W.2d	367,	372	(Minn.	2008).	
	 161.	 4	MNPRAC	CIVJIG	27.10	(6th	ed.	2014).	
	 162.	 George,	724	N.W.2d	at	10–11	(citation	omitted).	
	 163.	 Id.	
	 164.	 Id.	
	 165.	 See	 Kryzer	 v.	 Champlin	Amer.	 Legion	No.	 600,	 494	N.W.2d	 35,	 37	 (Minn.	
1992)	(intoxication	of	patron	who	was	injured	while	being	ejected	from	the	legion	
club	was	not	the	cause	of	her	injury,	but	only	the	“occasion”).	
	 166.	 The	Third	Restatement’s	provision	governing	the	scope	of	liability	provides,	
simply,	that	“[a]n	actor’s	liability	is	limited	to	those	harms	that	result	from	the	risks	
that	made	the	actor’s	conduct	tortious.”	RESTATEMENT	(THIRD)	OF	TORTS:	LIABILITY	FOR	
PHYSICAL	AND	EMOTIONAL	HARM	§	29	(AM.	LAW	INST.	2010).	The	Restatement	rejects	the	
term	“proximate	cause”	because	of	the	confusion	it	causes.	Id.	§	29	cmt.	b.	The	concept	
is	straightforward.	First	determine	what	risks	led	to	the	conclusion	that	the	defendant	
acted	negligently.	 Second,	 determine	whether	 the	 injury	 sustained	by	 the	plaintiff	
falls	within	the	scope	of	the	negligently	created	risks.	The	Reporters’	Notes	to	com-
ment	(b)	of	section	29	offered	the	four	alternative	instructions:	
(1) You	must	decide	whether	the	harm	to	the	plaintiff	is	within	the	
scope	 of	 the	 defendant’s	 liability.	 To	 do	 that,	 you	 must	 first	
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VI.	CONCLUSION	
Fenrich	v.	Blake	School	highlights	recurring	issues	in	Minnesota	
tort	 law,	 including	 the	 special	 relationship	 issue,	 the	 misfea-
sance/nonfeasance	problem,	and	the	issue	of	when	foreseeability	be-
comes	a	question	for	the	trier	of	fact	and	not	the	judge.	It	also	invites	
inquiry	into	the	appropriate	method	of	resolving	those	issues	at	trial,	
along	with	the	other	basic	issues	in	a	negligence	case.	
The	essential	question	in	Fenrich	concerned	a	school’s	responsi-
bility	for	the	actions	of	one	of	its	students	in	causing	an	accident	while	
	
consider	why	you	found	the	defendant	negligent	[or	some	other	
basis	for	tort	liability].	You	should	consider	all	of	the	dangers	that	
the	defendant	should	have	taken	reasonable	steps	[or	other	tort	
obligation]	 to	 avoid.	 The	 defendant	 is	 liable	 for	 the	 plaintiff’s	
harm	if	you	find	that	the	plaintiff’s	harm	arose	from	the	same	gen-
eral	 type	 of	 danger	 that	 was	 one	 of	 those	 that	 the	 defendant	
should	have	taken	reasonable	steps	[or	other	tort	obligation]	to	
avoid.	If	the	plaintiff’s	harm,	however,	did	not	arise	from	the	same	
general	 dangers	 that	 the	 defendant	 failed	 to	 take	 reasonable	
steps	[or	other	tort	obligation]	to	avoid,	then	you	must	find	that	
the	defendant	is	not	liable	for	the	plaintiff’s	harm.	
(2) You	must	decide	whether	the	harm	to	the	plaintiff	is	within	the	
scope	of	 the	defendant’s	 liability.	The	plaintiff’s	harm	 is	within	
the	scope	of	defendant’s	liability	if	that	harm	arose	from	the	same	
general	type	of	danger	that	was	among	the	dangers	that	the	de-
fendant	should	have	taken	reasonable	steps	[or	other	tort	obliga-
tion]	to	avoid.	If	you	find	that	the	plaintiff’s	harm	arose	from	such	
a	danger,	you	shall	find	the	defendant	liable	for	that	harm.	If	you	
find	the	plaintiff’s	harm	arose	from	some	other	danger,	then	you	
shall	find	for	the	defendant.	
(3) To	decide	if	the	defendant	is	liable	for	the	plaintiff’s	harm,	think	
about	the	dangers	you	considered	when	you	found	the	defendant	
negligent	 [or	otherwise	 subject	 to	 tort	 liability].	Then	consider	
the	plaintiff’s	harm.	You	must	 find	 the	defendant	 liable	 for	 the	
plaintiff’s	harm	if	it	arose	from	one	of	the	dangers	that	made	the	
defendant	negligent	 [or	otherwise	subject	 to	 tort	 liability].	You	
must	find	the	defendant	not	liable	for	harm	that	arose	from	dif-
ferent	dangers.	
(4) You	must	decide	whether	thse	plaintiff’s	harm	was	of	the	same	
general	 type	 of	 harm	 that	 the	 defendant	 should	 have	 acted	 to	
avoid.	If	you	find	that	it	is,	you	shall	find	for	the	plaintiff.	If	you	
find	that	it	is	not	the	same	general	type,	you	must	find	for	the	de-
fendant.	
Id.	§	29	cmt.	b,	Reporters’	Note.	The	fourth	alternative	is	the	simplest.	See	id.	The	scope	
of	liability	concept	is	captured	in	the	first	sentence.	See	id.	The	second	would	not	be	
used	when	the	case	is	submitted	on	a	special	verdict.	See	id.	
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on	a	trip	with	other	students	and	an	assistant	and	volunteer	coach	to	
an	out-of-season	cross	country	meet	in	another	state.167	The	school’s	
liability	turned	on	whether	there	was	a	special	relationship	between	
the	school	and	the	student	that	would	impose	a	duty	on	the	school	to	
use	reasonable	care	for	the	protection	of	a	third	person,	and,	 if	not,	
whether	the	school	created	an	affirmative	risk	of	injury	because	of	its	
involvement	in	coordinating	arrangements	to	send	the	students	to	the	
meet,	and,	if	it	did,	whether	it	was	foreseeable	to	the	school	that	an	
accident	involving	a	student	driver	would	occur.168	
The	micro	view	is	that	summary	judgment	was	inappropriate	and	
that	the	key	issues	had	to	be	resolved	at	trial.169	But	decisions	rever-
berate.	Fenrich	stands	for	broader	propositions.	One	is	that	the	court	
rejected	any	categorical	rule	that	schools	could	not	be	liable	for	inju-
ries	caused	by	students	to	third	parties.170	Although	that	may	appear	
to	create	the	possibility	for	a	potentially	unlimited	expansion	of	liabil-
ity,171	the	court’s	fact-specific	analysis	of	the	case	and	disinclination	
to	 find	 a	 special	 relationship	 between	 the	 school	 and	 student	 that	
would	impose	a	duty	on	the	school	for	the	protection	of	third	persons	
belies	that	concern.	
In	cases	involving	close	calls	on	the	foreseeability	issue,	the	su-
preme	court	continues	to	require	resolution	of	the	issue	by	the	trier	
of	fact	where	there	are	conflicted	inferences	that	can	be	drawn	from	
the	 facts.	The	court’s	continued	cautions	on	that	 issue	are	certainly	
consistent	with	past	decisions,	but	the	impact	is	that	the	court’s	foot-
print	in	its	recent	decisions	is	clear	in	requiring	careful	consideration	
of	summary	judgment	motions	involving	the	foreseeability	issue.	
	
	
	 167.	 Fenrich	v.	Blake	Sch.,	920	N.W.2d	195,	198	(Minn.	2018).	
	 168.	 Id.	at	201–02.		
	 169.	 Id.	at	205.	
	 170.	 Id.	at	202.	
	 171.	 Id.	at	207	(Anderson,	J.,	dissenting).	
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